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Abstract 
 
In 2003, Michael Lewis published Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair 
Game, which forever changed the finances and economics of baseball. It began a 
movement towards using advanced statistical analysis to determine the value of 
baseball players, in order to build a roster that will win the most games at the 
lowest cost. The Moneyball movement has resulted in a multitude of new 
statistics to try to drill a player’s value down to one number that represents his 
marginal revenue product, or his individual contribution to the team’s success. 
 
Player salaries are typically the largest cost for Major League Baseball teams. 
Players often get paid millions of dollars because there are so few people who 
have their athletic abilities and skill sets needed to succeed in baseball at the 
major league level. The average salary of Major League Baseball players in 2012 
was over $3.2 million (Associated Press, 2012). It is of the utmost importance for 
Major League Baseball teams to efficiently spend their money on players in order 
to win games at the lowest possible cost. 
 
The biggest factor that determines how much a player will be paid is his 
production on the playing field. The better one plays, the more he will be paid. 
However, there are many other factors that affect how much players are paid that 
are often overlooked. This project looks at many other factors, aside from a 
player’s talent and production levels, that may influence how much he is paid.  
 
This study used linear regression analyses to isolate relationships between player 
salaries and a multitude of different factors which may have significant 
relationships to salaries. I have used online websites and databases to gather 
contract data and player performance data for a time period of one decade. The 
data includes a sample size of 761 player contracts signed between the 2002-2003 
offseason and the 2011-2012 offseason. The project includes statistical 
breakdowns for hitters only, pitchers only, and all players combined, in order to 
gain the best understanding of what is actually impacting player contracts, and 
which kinds of contracts are being affected. 
 
I have concluded that the impact of agents can be quite significant and large, 
although varied. Furthermore, I have uncovered several strategies that agents can 
use to maximize the salaries that they negotiate for their clients, like trying to 
position clients to sign contracts in December. I have also analyzed practices of 
teams to try to find the best value players at a given talent level, looking at the 
teams which have done so successfully.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In 2003, Michael Lewis published Moneyball: The Art of Winning an 
Unfair Game, which forever changed the finances and economics of baseball. It 
began a movement towards using advanced statistical analysis to determine the 
value of baseball players, in order to build a roster that will win the most games at 
the lowest cost (Lewis, 2003). The Moneyball movement has resulted in a 
multitude of new statistics to try to drill a player’s value down to one number that 
represents his marginal revenue product, or his individual contribution to the 
team’s success. 
However, these statistics ignore other factors that affect how much teams 
pay their players. Aside from their on-field production, there are numerous other 
factors that influence players’ salaries, including: 
• The player’s age 
• The time of year of the contract’s signing 
• Whether or not the player is a Free Agent 
• The team and market signing the player 
• The player’s agent 
These other factors will be the primary focus of this project. This information can 
help Major League Baseball teams effectively sign players for contracts below the 
market value of their on-field production. It can also help player agents to get 
their players contracts above market value. The project will put a specific 
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emphasis on player agents and their influence on their clients’ salaries. Similarly, 
the team that a player is signing with is of significant importance in this project. 
By studying this information, we can ascertain which teams are adept at finding 
players that they can pay below market value, and which teams tend to overpay 
certain players. 
 For this study, the data being used includes Major League Baseball player 
contracts signed beginning in the 2002-2003 offseason and continuing through the 
2011-2012 offseason. In 2002, the total payrolls (by payroll, I am referring to the 
amount of money each team spends on paying its players) of all 30 teams was 
$2.04 billion (Brown, 2013). In 2012, that figure is $3.15 billion, representing an 
increase of 54% (Brown, 2013). Surely, this is not solely due to inflation. Clearly, 
the amount of money players are being paid has increased tremendously in the 
past decade, so it is of the utmost importance to the teams compensating these 
players, and the player agents negotiating the contracts, to be able to position 
themselves as favorably as possible to negotiate the best possible contract. 
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Previous Research 
 There is limited published research on determinants of Major League 
Baseball player salaries and impacts of external factors presented in this study. 
However, some research is found on how Major League Baseball players are paid. 
Palmer and King (2006) found that Major League Baseball players are fairly 
compensated for their on-field contributions, and are not discriminated by race 
factoring into their salaries. They used statistics like slugging percentage, age, 
MLB experience, at bats per year, runs created per game, and fielding percentage 
to represent a player’s on-field performance and proxy what he should get paid if 
there is no discrimination. Furthermore, Link and Yosifov (2012) studied whether 
Major League Baseball players are willing to forego extra monetary returns on 
their performance in exchange for job security. In other words, they found that 
players are willing to take smaller per-year salaries in exchange for longer term 
contracts, in general.  
 However, studies are lacking when it comes to studying how effective 
agents and teams are at negotiating favorable player contracts. Peter Schwartz, a 
researcher for Forbes, devised a methodology to analyze contracts that agents 
negotiate for their players based on comparisons to statistically similar players 
who had signed contracts at the same age, while taking into account the average 
league salary at the time of the contract signing. They valued the contract, found 
the value’s multiple of the league average salary, and compared this multiple to  
statistically similar players who signed a contract at the same age, and finally 
adjusted for inflation. Their results show Peter Greenberg, who represents many 
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of baseball’s current and past stars like Jose Reyes, Johan Santana, and Bobby 
Abreu as baseball’s best agent, earning his clients approximately 2.5 times what a 
statistically similar player would earn on average on the open market (Schwartz, 
2007). Their analysis ranks Randy and Alan Hendricks second to Greenberg. 
Forbes does not reveal their method for finding statistically similar players. This 
also does not account for players who aren’t free agents and are instead signing 
contract extensions, or other factors like the time of year of the signing. 
  
Chapter 2 
Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement 
 
 Collective bargaining is defined as “negotiation between an employer and 
a labor union usually on wages, hours, and working conditions” (Collective 
Bargaining, 2013). The end-product of collective bargaining is a collective 
bargaining agreement, which is a document that states the agreed upon wages, 
hours, working conditions, and more between the employer and the labor union. 
The document is signed by both parties and is valid for a specified time period, 
which is agreed upon by both parties. It is a fully enforceable, legal contract. 
 In Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (or CBA 
for short), Major League Baseball serves as the employer. The players, who are 
the employees, are represented by the Major League Baseball Players Association. 
The MLB CBA governs basic employment practices such as working conditions 
and wages, as in the definition above. However, it also governs the entire 
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structure of the league, such as the length of the season, the procedures for drug 
testing,  the procedure to make any rule changes to the actual on-field game, a 
revenue sharing plan among all 30 teams, and much more. The CBA includes all 
rules for the behind-the-scenes business of Major League Baseball. In short, it 
contains all guidelines governing Major League Baseball except for those in the 
rule book about physically playing the game of baseball. Most importantly to this 
project, the Collective Bargaining Agreement spells out all the details governing 
player contracts, from who is eligible to sign new contracts, to the minimum 
salary, to how the values of the contracts are calculated. 
 Most of Major League Baseball’s CBAs have had a term of approximately 
five years. The contracts included in this project span three different agreements: 
the 1997 agreement, the 2003 agreement, and the 2007 agreement (Brown, 2013). 
However, all of the basic rules regarding player contracts have remained the same 
or structurally similar so that their minute differences are negligible with regards 
to this project. Whenever I refer to “the CBA,” I am referring to no specific 
agreement in particular, but rather, to the general rules governing MLB player 
contracts that are the same in all three of these agreements. Recently, a new CBA 
was ratified that went into effect in 2012. Although this agreement also does not 
significantly change any of the basic structures of player contracts, it does have 
some slightly different rules which could have some effect on future player 
contracts. 
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Free Agency 
 A free agent is defined as “a professional athlete (as a baseball player) 
who is free to negotiate a contract with any team” (Free Agent, 2013). As defined 
by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, a free agent is a player whose previous 
contract has expired and has not yet signed a new contract. A free agent is 
allowed to sell his services to any team desiring to compensate him for his playing 
abilities. However, not just any player without a contract is eligible to become a 
free agent. In baseball, in order to be eligible to become a free agent upon the 
expiration of one’s contract, a player must have accumulated six or more years of 
Major League service time (Major League Baseball, 2006). That is, he must have 
been on a major league roster for at least a sum of six years before becoming a 
free agent. Service time can be accumulated while a player is on an active roster 
or is injured. A player does not accumulate service time while playing in the 
minor leagues (each major league team has some affiliated minor league teams to 
which it can send its players who it deems are not yet ready to play in the major 
leagues) (Major League Baseball, 2006).  
 However, one way for a player to become a free agent before his contract 
expires, or before accumulating six years of Major League service time, is if he is 
released by the team he was under contract with (Major League Baseball, 2006). 
A player is released when a team decides he is no longer wanted in the 
organization. Usually, players who are released are marginal players at best. For 
one, if the player was better, it is unlikely that his team would want to get rid of 
him. Also, if he was better and the team still didn’t want him, they would likely 
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trade him to another team. When a team decides to release a player, the player 
immediately becomes a free agent. However, while the player is a free agent, the 
team that released him still has to pay him according to his existing contract; 
however, the player is free to sign a new contract with a new team regardless of 
how much service time he has accumulated. Players who are free agents solely 
because they were just released usually receive low salaries. They are not only 
less skilled players, but also have very few teams interested in them. 
 Beginning five days after the World Series ends (usually in late October), 
players who are eligible officially become free agents and are free to negotiate 
and sign with any team. The amount of days between the World Series ending and 
free agency beginning has been as much as fifteen days during the scope of the 
project, but it is currently at five days (Major League Baseball, 2006).  
 
Arbitration 
 At the beginning of the offseason, teams have the option to offer 
arbitration to their own players with expiring contracts who are eligible to become 
free agents (eligibility requirements are outlined in previous section) (Major 
League Baseball, 2006). If the player accepts the offer of arbitration, he agrees to 
return to the team for at least one more season. If the team and player can’t agree 
to a new contract, they will go to an arbitration hearing in which the team and the 
player will each submit a salary figure for how much they want the compensation 
to be for the upcoming season. An independent arbitrator chooses which salary is 
more fair, based on past rulings and the arguments made by the team and the 
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player (usually represented by his agent). The arbitrator can only choose the 
salary submitted by the team or the one submitted by the player, but nothing else. 
 If the player rejects the team’s offer of arbitration, he is a free agent. 
However, depending on how well the player has performed in the past, he may be 
designated as a player in which his old team will receive compensation in the 
form of an amateur player draft pick if he signs elsewhere . The former team only 
receives this compensation if they offered arbitration to the player, he rejected it, 
and signed with a new team (Major League Baseball, 2006). 
 In the past, some of the best free agents were specified as being “Type A” 
or “Type B” free agents at the beginning of each offseason. The best players were 
“Type A,” the next tier of players was “Type B,” and the rest of the free agents 
were not designated in this way (Major League Baseball, 2006). Major League 
Baseball uses a complex formula to determine which free agents belong to which 
tier, if any. If a Type A free agent signed with a new team, his new organization 
would have to give up its first round draft pick in the next amateur draft to the 
player’s former team as compensation for the player leaving (Major League 
Baseball, 2006).  
If a Type B free agent signed with a new team, the player’s previous team 
would receive an additional draft pick, but the new team wouldn’t have to 
surrender any of its own picks (Major League Baseball, 2006). Again, this 
compensation only happens if the player’s former team offered him arbitration. 
These designations overall have not affected player salaries very much, 
but at times diminished the value of the lower rated Type A players, because a 
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team signing a Type A free agent must surrender its first round draft pick. The 
elite free agents, however, are not affected because they are the best players in the 
league; the teams that sign them do not mind losing the draft pick because of the 
high caliber of the player that they are signing. However, the weaker of the Type 
A free agents are very good players, but not necessarily elite. Therefore, teams 
sometimes become hesitant to forfeit a future draft pick in order to sign a player 
who is not elite, resulting in these players sometimes getting paid less money.  
Another result has been that some of these players who are ranked as a 
Type A free agent have chosen not to even reach the free agent market. When 
their teams offered them arbitration at the beginning of the offseason, some of the 
Type A players who felt as if the draft pick compensation would hurt their free 
agent value have opted to accept arbitration and stay with their organization, with 
an arbitrator deciding the player’s salary for the next season. This system has been 
changed under the newest CBA. However, this is the system that was in place for 
the contracts signed during the scope of this project (2002—2012). 
Arbitration does not only apply to players eligible for free agency, as 
outlined above. Before a player accumulates six years of Major League service 
time, there are different rules for how they sign new contracts during these six 
years prior to their free agency eligibility. In general, when a player has less than 
three years of service time, the team can choose to pay him any salary they want, 
provided that it is at least at the minimum salary ($480,000 for the 2012 season) 
(Major League Baseball, 2006). These salaries are usually paid in separate one 
year contracts for each of the player’s first three years in the Major Leagues. 
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When a player has accrued between three and six years of Major League 
service time and his contract expires, he is in a different situation. He is not yet 
eligible for free agency. He is also past the time period when his team can pay 
him the league minimum. This is where arbitration comes into play. Each year 
between having three and six years of service time, the player and his team can 
submit to arbitration (Major League Baseball, 2006). Similar to the process 
outlined previously, each party submits their desired salary number and the 
arbitrator can only choose one of the two submitted figures. The arbitrator is 
asked to rule based on comparable arbitration cases and how much service time 
the player has. For example, if a player with three years of service time (first time 
arbitration eligible) and a player with four years of service time (second time 
arbitration eligible) have the same performance statistics, the player with four 
years of service time will be rewarded a higher salary at his arbitration hearing.  
During this six year period before a player becomes eligible for free 
agency, he is also allowed to negotiate one year or longer term contracts with his 
current team. Some players choose to sign a long term contract and never go to 
arbitration, while others opt to go to arbitration each year they are eligible for it 
before they reach free agency. 
As soon as the offseason begins (usually late October), a team knows 
which of its players will be eligible for arbitration based on Major League service 
time. Arbitration hearings usually take place in February. Therefore, the team and 
the player have a significant period of time to discuss a one year contract 
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settlement, signing a long term deal, or not agreeing to a contract and actually 
following through to the arbitration hearing. 
In summation, before a player is eligible for free agency, they will be paid 
a salary close to the league minimum for three years, and then go to arbitration for 
three years, unless they agree to a contract with their team before their arbitration 
hearing. There are some situations in which a player with between two and three 
years of service time can become eligible for arbitration (Major League Baseball, 
2006). These players are called “Super Two” players. They will only be paid 
approximately the minimum salary for two years, and will be eligible to go to 
arbitration four times before free agency eligibility. In order to be a Super Two 
player, you must be in the top 22% in accumulated service time among all of the 
players who have between two and three years of service time, with at least 86 
days of service time in the previous season (Major League Baseball, 2006). 
Teams sometimes try to avoid allowing their players to accumulate the service 
time to become a Super Two, because it results in the player getting an extra year 
of arbitration replacing a year of getting paid the minimum salary, which costs the 
team a lot more money. This status affects long-term contract negotiations, 
because if a player looks like he might gain Super Two status and he is 
negotiating a potential long term contract with his team, he can demand more 
money than a player who will not qualify for Super Two status. 
If a team has a player that it no longer wants in the organization and the 
player is eligible for arbitration, the team can choose to non-tender the player. 
This means that instead of submitting to arbitration, the team has opted not to 
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tender the player a new contract for the upcoming season. This is very similar to 
releasing a player. However, this happens when a player does not have a current 
contract, so he is not being released from a contract, he is simply not being 
tendered a new contract by his team which has exclusive control over him.  
When a player is non-tendered, he becomes a free agent even though he 
doesn’t have the six years of Major League service time. In a similar fashion to 
players who are released, players who are non-tendered are likely to earn very low 
salaries for the same reasons. They are typically underperforming players, and 
sometimes have health concerns which lead their original team to prefer to non-
tender them rather than pay them what they would earn in arbitration.  
Arbitration salaries can be significant. Players are almost always rewarded 
a raise over their previous salary in arbitration. In the 2011-2012 offseason, the 
142 players who filed for arbitration received an 89% raise on average from their 
2011 salaries (Associated Press, 2012). Therefore, a common non-tender 
candidate is someone who had a very good season, earned a high salary in 
arbitration, and then had a disappointing season, but would still likely earn a raise 
through arbitration due simply to another year of accumulated service time. This 
player’s team may prefer to non-tender the player rather than provide him a salary 
raise after a disappointing season.  
 
Contract Extensions 
 A player and his team can negotiate a contract extension at any time. It 
doesn’t matter how much service time the player has, if he is eligible for free 
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agency, or how much time he still has on his current contract. The player and his 
own team are always free to negotiate extensions to his current contract. This is 
very common when a player is in his arbitration eligibility stage before his free 
agency eligibility. Often, both the player and the team seek some stability rather 
than having three separate one year contracts during that time period. Therefore, it 
is common for a player and his team to negotiate a contract extension to cover 
some or all of the player’s three (or four) arbitration years before he becomes 
eligible for free agency. Sometimes, these contract extensions even cover time 
periods in which the player would have been eligible for free agency had he not 
signed the extension. These extensions typically pay the player more money, all 
else equal, due to the fact that he is delaying free agency, where he can sell his 
skills on an open market, rather than just arbitration years, where he would make 
less than if he was on the open market.  
 
Competitive Balance Tax 
 In baseball, teams’ ability to generate revenue varies greatly depending on 
the size of the market in which they are located. For example, the New York 
Yankees, playing in baseball’s largest market, generate much higher revenues 
from their television rights and ticket sales than the Oakland Athletics, located in 
one of baseball’s smallest markets. Teams that generate more revenue have more 
money to spend on acquiring the best players, forming a self serving competitive 
advantage. In order to attempt to combat this inequality and level the playing field, 
Major League Baseball has a competitive balance tax (also known as a luxury tax), 
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which taxes teams that go over a certain payroll threshold (Major League Baseball, 
2011). The tax money collected goes into a pool that is re-distributed to teams in 
the smallest markets. In order to calculate a team’s payroll for the purposes of the 
competitive balance tax, each player’s average annual value of his contract is used, 
rather than his actual salary for that specific season. Any signing bonuses are also 
averaged out over the full course of his contract for competitive balance tax 
calculations. 
 The tax threshold is usually a very high payroll that only one or two teams 
exceed each season. The tax also gets harsher for teams that go over the threshold 
in consecutive years. Under the most recent Collective Bargaining Agreement, the 
tax rates are as follows: 
 
First Time Payer 
 
17.5% 
 
Second Consecutive Year Paying 
 
30% 
 
Third Consecutive Year Paying 
 
40% 
 
Fourth Consecutive Year Paying and All Subsequent Years 
 
50% 
(Major League Baseball, 2011) 
Tax payments are calculated on just the amount of the overage above the 
threshold, not the team’s full payroll. The threshold for 2013 is $178 million, and 
it will rise to $189 million in 2014 (Major League Baseball, 2011). 
 
Chapter 3 
The Contract Negotiation 
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 A typical Major League Baseball contract negotiation consists of two 
parties: the player and the team. The team is usually represented by the General 
Manager. The player is usually represented by his agent. The agent’s job is to 
negotiate the highest salary possible for the player. He does this by trying to 
showcase his client’s on-field abilities, comparing him to other players who 
received desirable contracts, and trying to get as many different teams interested 
as possible to increase the demand for his client. He also tries to “time the market” 
to try to sign a contract when the demand for his client would be the highest. It is 
also of the agent’s best interest to get his client the highest salary for the longest 
period of time, as agents get paid as a percentage of the salary that they negotiate 
for their clients.  
 As an example of showing an agent’s role in negotiations, I will discuss 
Scott Boras, Major League Baseball’s most well-known player agent.  Boras 
represents well over 100 baseball players, and is known for always maximizing 
how much his clients get paid. He is known to create a binder for each of his high 
profile free agents which uses statistics to compare his clients to the best players 
of all time and some of the highest paid players of all time (Crasnick, 2011). He 
circulates these binders to any team which he thinks may have any remote interest 
in his client. Boras tends to wait out the market, and usually signs his clients to 
contracts with teams relatively late in the offseason (late December or January as 
opposed to November or early December).  
 These strategies will be put to the test later in this paper. I will show how 
much of an affect Scott Boras, as well as some other prominent agents, have on 
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their clients’ salaries. I will also show how effective some of these agents’ 
strategies are, like waiting out the market versus signing early in the offseason.  
 
Chapter 4 
Methodology 
 
 The methodology used for analysis in this study is ordinary least squares 
regression. I will use multiple regression to isolate many different factors that 
may be related to player contracts, by using the classical linear regression model 
of ordinary least squares regression. This method gives the best linear unbiased 
estimators of the different factors relating to contracts that I will analyze. 
 There are some inherent assumptions in the ordinary least squares 
regression technique. When broken, adjustments are made to the regression 
results in order to get the best linear unbiased estimators of the different 
independent variables. In linear regression, an error term is included and is 
calculated in results as the actual value of the dependent variable for that 
observation minus the value that the regression equation would have predicted for 
the observation. It is within this error term that assumptions of linear regression 
are often broken (Gujarati, 2011). 
The first assumption that is often broken is that the error terms are 
homoskedastic, which means that they have a constant variance (Gujarati, 2011). 
The condition known as heteroskedasticity is when the variance of the error term 
is not constant. When heteroskedasticity is present, I will adjust using White’s 
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heteroskedasticity correction, which fixes the problem by replacing the standard 
errors of coefficient estimates with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors (Gujarati, 2011). 
Additionally, it is assumed in linear regression that the error terms are 
independent of each other. Autocorrelation is a condition in which the error terms 
are related to each other (Gujarati, 2011). When autocorrelation is present, I will 
adjust using Newey and West’s correction, which replaces the standard errors of 
coefficient estimates with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors (Gujarati, 2011). This correction also works when both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable for my analysis is the value of each player’s 
contract. However, there are many ways to value player contracts. The media 
tends to value contracts in terms of the total amount of money that the player will 
earn over the course of the contract, or in terms of average annual value. This first 
method is represented by the sum of all payments from the team to the player. The 
average annual value method takes this sum and divides it by the number of years 
in the contract. 
 However, basic financial theory tells us that money has a time value; a 
dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future based on interest rates. The 
way that the media reports salary figures does not differentiate between when the 
team pays players. Some contracts are “backloaded” which means that the yearly 
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salary increases throughout the duration of the contract, while others are 
“frontloaded” which means that the highest salary is in the first year, with a 
decreasing salary each year thereafter. Clearly, two contracts with the same 
average annual value can in reality be worth very different amounts based on the 
time value of money.  
 My valuation of each contract will be based on the present value of each 
payment from the team to the player, as an average divided by the number of 
years in the contract. For simplicity purposes, I will assume all payments are 
made at the end of the year in which they are due. Major League Baseball’s 
Collective Bargaining Agreement states that in present value calculations, the 
interest rate to be used is “equal to the total of the prime interest 
rate in effect at The J.P. Morgan Chase Bank on the immediately preceding 
November 1, plus one percent, rounded to the nearest full percentage point.” 
These are the instructions regarding interest rates in all of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreements throughout the span of this project’s data. 
 However, this methodology does not account for differences in the length 
of contracts. If there are two contracts with the same average present value per 
year, the one with more years would be more valuable. In order to account for that, 
I will use my valuation of present value per year as well as the number of years as 
a separate dependent variable. I will present results reflecting present value per 
year, as well as reflecting the number of years in the contract. 
 Additionally, baseball teams have two distinct groups of players: hitters 
and pitchers. Hitters and pitchers possess specific skill sets and their performance 
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is measured in completely different ways. Therefore, I will be presenting results 
and analysis that is hitter-specific, pitcher-specific, and results that pertain to both 
hitters and pitchers.  
The average present value per year of contracts signed in my sample range 
is $5.201 million; $5.375 million for pitchers and $5.028 million for hitters. This 
difference signifies a scarcity of good pitchers relative to good hitters. Overall, the 
distribution of salaries is right skewed. This is caused by outliers being present on 
the high range of salaries but not the low range, due to Major League Baseball’s 
CBA containing a minimum salary, but no maximum salary. Therefore, the worst 
players can’t make a salary less than a certain number, but the best players can 
make an unlimited salary. 
 
Independent Variables 
 As previously stated, my focus in this project is on factors affecting player 
salaries other than their on-field production. However, in order to set a baseline 
for salaries, I must include on-field production in my regression analysis to 
account for differences in talent. The main performance statistic that I will use is 
Wins Above Replacement (WAR). The basic idea behind WAR is to isolate a 
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single player’s win contribution to any given team (FanGraphs, 2013). In other 
words, WAR represents how many more wins a single player provides than a 
replacement player would. A replacement player is considered a player that would 
ordinarily be a reserve player on the bench or a higher-level minor league player 
(FanGraphs, 2013). There are two different versions of WAR. Both have the same 
basic idea behind them, and they are extremely similar. The differences between 
the two versions are small calculation differences done by their providers, notably 
the way they calculate pitching skills, which defensive metric they use, and which 
baserunning metric they use. I will use the version of WAR from FanGraphs.  
 WAR takes everything a player does, whether it is hitting, fielding, 
running the bases, and/or pitching, and combines it into one number. It also 
adjusts for what position the player plays, or if he can play multiple positions 
(FanGraphs, 2013). In baseball, there is a scarcity at some positions that are more 
difficult to play than others. For example, catcher and shortstop are known as 
positions that are very difficult to play, and there are not many catchers and 
shortstops who are skilled at both hitting and fielding. Usually, you can find a 
catcher or a shortstop who is a good fielder but a below average hitter; or a poor 
fielder and an above average hitter, but rarely one who is good both offensively 
and defensively. WAR adjusts for this and places a premium on the positions that 
are most scarce and most difficult to play.  
WAR is also scaled to the league averages of every year, so players in 
high scoring eras can be compared to players from low scoring eras using WAR 
(FanGraphs, 2013). WAR is also adjusted for stadium factors such as the size and 
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dimensions of the ballpark (FanGraphs, 2013). In baseball, some stadiums are 
known as “hitters’ parks” while others are known as “pitchers’ parks.” For 
example, the home run wall at Yankee Stadium is fairly shallow (314 feet to the 
right field fence), and closer to home plate than the home run wall at many other 
stadiums. Therefore, it is easier to hit home runs in Yankee Stadium than many 
other stadiums, so it is known as a hitters’ park. The same is true in opposite cases, 
as well. Comerica Park, in Detroit, has home run walls that are very far away 
from home plate, making it more challenging to hit home runs there, which is why 
Comerica Park is known as a pitchers’ park.  
 Comerica Park Yankee Stadium 
Left Field 345 feet 318 feet 
Left Center 370 feet 399 feet 
Center Field 420 feet 408 feet 
Right Center 365 feet 385 feet 
Right Field 330 feet 314 feet 
(Detroit Tigers, 2013) (New York Yankees, 2013) 
Other reasons for different stadiums to have affects like this could be 
climate. Coors Field, in Denver, Colorado, is also an extreme hitters’ park 
because due to the thin air of Denver’s high altitude, baseballs hit in the air tend 
to go farther than they would in a stadium in a lower altitude, making it easier to 
hit home runs at Coors Field. WAR takes these factors into account so that 
players who hit home runs in hitters parks don’t get as much credit for them as 
players who hit home runs in pitchers parks. In general, the following table 
represents normal what typical WAR figures are for different kinds of players: 
 
Minor League Player/Bad Bench Player 
 
<0 WAR 
 
Bench Player 
 
0-1 WAR 
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Part Time Player 
 
1-2 WAR 
 
Average Starting Player 
 
2-3 WAR 
 
Good Starting Player 
 
3-4 WAR 
 
All-Star 
 
4-5 WAR 
 
Superstar 
 
5-6 WAR 
 
Most Valuable Player Award Candidate 
 
6+ WAR 
(FanGraphs, 2013) 
 
 Furthermore, a hitter’s value can be broken down into four elements: 
batting, baserunning, fielding, and positional values. Each of these values 
represent how many runs above average the player was worth. For example, a 
player with a batting value of 10 means that over the course of that season, his 
batting alone was worth 10 runs to his team above what an average player would 
produce. A baserunning value of 10 means that the player’s actions while running 
the bases was worth 10 more runs to his team above average. A fielding value of 
10 means that the player’s fielding saved 10 runs from being allowed to 
opponents compared to an average player. Positional values are the component of 
WAR which adjusts for position difficulty and scarcity discussed above 
(FanGraphs, 2013). I will perform analysis on all players using WAR. 
Additionally, I will analyze hitters in terms of batting, baserunning, fielding, and 
positional values to see which of these values most affects their salaries.  
 Other independent variables included are the player’s age, whether he is 
resigning with the same team or signing with a new team, the offseason during 
which the contract is signed, the month of the signing, and how many years the 
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player has remaining until he would become a free agent. I also will take into 
account other factors such as a no-trade clause, which is a clause that a player and 
team may agree to write into a contract which prohibits the team from trading the 
player to another team.  
Conventional wisdom about baseball players documents that they perform 
at their best in their late twenties to early thirties. Therefore, players in this age 
range or players who have not yet reached this age range are in the highest 
demand. I expect age to have a negative relationship with salary. 
The term “home town discount” is tossed around by the media often 
during Major League Baseball’s free agency period. The theory behind the term is 
that if a player really wants to play for his pre-existing team, when he becomes a 
free agent he will be willing to take less money to remain with his organization 
rather than make more money and sign with a different team. I will test the 
validity of that theory. 
Over time, as previously discussed, total team payrolls in Major League 
Baseball have steadily increased.  
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Therefore, I will include the year of the offseason in which contracts were signed 
as an independent variable to capture this upward trend of player salaries. This 
will also explain any periods that had particularly good players who signed new 
contracts in the same offseason. I will exclude the 2002-2003 offseason variable, 
as the results for all other years will be in comparison to 2002-2003. The time of 
year in which a contract is signed will be indicated by the months of the offseason, 
starting with September, the last month of MLB’s regular season, and ending with 
April, the first month of MLB’s regular season. This will test if players tend to be 
overpaid or underpaid based on what point in the offseason they choose to sign 
their contracts. September will be omitted from results as a comparison point for 
all other months. 
 I expect the number of years until free agent eligibility to have a profound 
negative effect on players’ salaries. This is because when a player is a free agent, 
which would be indicated by zero years until free agency, he is in a free, open 
market to sell his services to any of 30 teams. However, if a player is signing a 
contract extension, but is not a free agent, he can only sell his services to his 
current team, which would likely result in him not being paid open market value. 
The longer that a player has until he will become a free agent, the greater discount 
he should have to take to sign a contract with his current team. 
 Additionally, the player’s agent will be included as a series of variables. 
An agent should have a profound effect on his clients’ contracts, because his job 
is to get them the highest salaries possible. For regression results including only 
hitters or only pitchers, I only included agents that were responsible for at least 
25 
 
eight contracts signed in the sample. For results including both hitters and pitchers, 
agents responsible for at least ten contracts are included.  
The team a player is signing with may also affect the salary he gets paid. 
Some teams, like the New York Yankees, have reputations for overpaying for 
players, while others, like the Oakland Athletics, have reputations of being able to 
find undervalued players and sign them at discounted salaries. The Colorado 
Rockies are omitted from regression results to serve as a comparison point for 
other teams. 
 As previously stated, no-trade clauses are rare features of contracts. Some 
teams even have policies in which they refuse to give any player a no trade clause, 
because it inhibits their ability to trade the player should the contract not work out 
as planned. When teams do agree to incorporate a no-trade clause into a contract, 
it is usually for a very good or elite player. If negotiated correctly, the player 
should have to forego some monetary value of his contract in exchange for the no 
trade provision, which would result in a negative relationship between a no trade 
clause and salary. I have only included no trade clause as a variable in regressions 
that do not include teams and agents. This is because some agents and teams often 
use no trade clauses in their negotiation tactics, and the effect of these no trade 
clauses is picked up by the agent and team categorical variables rather than by the 
no trade clause variable when it is included with agents and/or teams. 
 
Chapter 5 
Regression Results and Analysis: Present Value Per Year 
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 I will first address results for present value per year of a contract 
(calculated by present value of contract divided by years of the contract). I will 
present tables of results for batters, pitchers, and both combined. Within each 
table, results will include regression results without teams or agents included as 
variables, with either one included, and with both included.  
Coefficients for each variable represent the relationship of that variable, 
on average, with the present value per year (in millions) of a player’s contract for 
each one unit increase of that variable. For example, a coefficient for WAR of one 
would mean that for every increase in one unit of WAR, a player will, on average, 
earn an additional one million dollars in their contract in terms of present value 
per year. A negative coefficient signifies an inverse relationship, in which when 
the variable increases, the player’s salary decreases. For categorical variables, like 
agent, each agent’s coefficient signifies the relationship between that agent and 
his clients’ salaries (in millions of dollars per year), on average. The T-Statistics 
represent the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error. The higher the absolute 
value of the T-Statistic is, the more statistically significant the coefficient is. In all 
tables, *** denotes statistical significance below 1%, ** denotes statistical 
significance below 5%, and * denotes statistical significance below 10%. 
Table 1: Present Value Per Year Results 
Hitters Only 
 Teams, 
Agents Not 
Included 
Teams 
Included, 
Agents Not 
Agents 
Included, 
Teams Not 
Teams, 
Agents 
Included 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Constant 0.1308 1.1777 -4.1575 -0.3143 
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(0.0160) (0.1320) (-0.4560) (-0.0329) 
WAR 
1.1732*** 
(14.1936) 
1.3701*** 
(16.0242) 
1.3089*** 
(15.7909) 
1.3033*** 
(15.2051) 
Age 
-0.0048 
(-0.0093) 
0.0174 
(0.0316) 
0.3144 
(0.5440) 
0.1131 
(0.1874) 
Age^2 
-0.0013 
(-0.1596) 
-0.0011 
(-0.1318) 
-0.0059 
(-0.6414) 
-0.0025 
(-0.2594) 
Re-sign 
0.8441** 
(2.4855) 
0.5304 
(1.4802) 
0.9351*** 
(2.5998) 
0.7081** 
(1.9862) 
2003-2004 
0.3140 
(0.4929) 
-0.4682 
(-0.8051) 
-0.1463 
(-0.2605) 
-0.7103 
(-1.1069) 
2004-2005 
1.5327** 
(2.5199) 
1.0381* 
(1.8582) 
1.0832** 
(2.4322) 
0.7846 
(1.4473) 
2005-2006 
2.0650*** 
(4.4706) 
1.6258*** 
(3.4398) 
1.3204*** 
(3.5421) 
1.2274** 
(2.5207) 
2006-2007 
2.5417*** 
(4.9368) 
2.5188*** 
(4.6347) 
2.4585*** 
(5.9210) 
2.1482*** 
(3.9388) 
2007-2008 
2.1909*** 
(4.1646) 
2.2390*** 
(3.6228) 
2.1599*** 
(3.6942) 
1.9239*** 
(3.0556) 
2008-2009 
2.6768*** 
(5.0990) 
2.5174*** 
(4.3561) 
2.3038*** 
(4.8492) 
1.9996*** 
(3.4251) 
2009-2010 
1.8754*** 
(3.8450) 
1.6250*** 
(2.7906) 
1.7013*** 
(3.3920) 
1.3770** 
(2.4320) 
2010-2011 
2.8421*** 
(6.0357) 
2.3154*** 
(4.4647) 
2.1065*** 
(4.6111) 
1.8340*** 
(3.3991) 
2011-2012 
2.4020*** 
(4.4909) 
1.9837*** 
(3.7511) 
1.9581*** 
(4.0883) 
1.6365*** 
(2.9708) 
Oct 
-1.0055 
(-0.5672) 
-0.1988 
(-0.1644) 
0.0302 
(0.0256) 
-0.1211 
(-0.1000) 
Nov 
0.8828 
(1.4429) 
-0.1356 
(-0.1754) 
0.0793 
(0.0932) 
-0.1678 
(-0.1980) 
Dec 
1.1684* 
(1.8319) 
0.0093 
(0.0124) 
0.2413 
(0.3278) 
-0.0225 
(-0.0279) 
Jan 
0.7227 
(1.1782) 
-0.2216 
(-0.2806) 
-0.5778 
(-0.7790) 
-0.5674 
(-0.6871) 
Feb 
1.2795 
(1.5817) 
0.1424 
(0.1541) 
0.0725 
(0.0787) 
-0.1457 
(-0.1488) 
Mar 
1.6175** 
(2.0224) 
1.3972 
(1.4659) 
1.1566 
(1.2402) 
1.2133 
(1.2644) 
Apr 
1.9129** 
(2.3591) 
1.7951* 
(1.7225) 
1.4163 
(1.4167) 
1.7530 
(1.6309) 
Years to Free 
Agency 
-0.8919*** 
(-5.1527) 
-0.9776*** 
(-4.6388) 
-0.9877*** 
(-5.2751) 
-0.9167*** 
(-4.3178) 
No Trade 
Clause 
4.4220*** 
(6.5286) 
 
  
Boras, Scott   1.7833*** 1.9012*** 
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(2.7429) (2.8327) 
Close, Casey 
 
 0.7941 
(0.7733) 
1.0667 
(1.0897) 
Garber, Bob 
 
 -1.3312** 
(-2.4071) 
-0.7493 
(-0.9715) 
Genske, Greg 
 
 1.7482* 
(1.7810) 
1.7771* 
(1.7015) 
Goldschmidt, 
Eric  
 -0.3192 
(-0.4611) 
1.4072 
(1.6335) 
Greenberg, 
Peter  
 -0.0955 
(-0.1085) 
-0.6593 
(-0.7594) 
Katz, Adam 
 
 0.0650 
(0.0670) 
-0.0975 
(-0.0880) 
Levinson, Sam 
& Seth  
 -0.0670 
(-0.1802) 
0.0524 
(0.1240) 
Lozano, Dan 
 
 1.3852* 
(1.8414) 
1.4588* 
(1.8500) 
Nero, Alan 
 
 -0.9179 
(-0.8131) 
-0.5767 
(-0.5178) 
Peters, Brian 
 
 0.9015 
(0.7738) 
1.3172 
(1.1171) 
Tellem, Arn 
 
 0.5681 
(0.7425) 
0.4654 
(0.6017) 
Wasserman 
Media Group  
 -0.9231 
(-1.5405) 
-0.6042 
(-0.7807) 
NYY 
 
-0.5125 
(-0.5279) 
 -0.7730 
(-0.8336) 
BOS 
 
-1.1911 
(-1.2785) 
 -0.9630 
(-1.0824) 
TB 
 
-1.4640 
(-1.1235) 
 -1.6389 
(-1.2258) 
TOR 
 
-1.1326 
(-1.3643) 
 -1.0357 
(-1.3080) 
BAL 
 
-1.6694* 
(-1.8342) 
 -1.0335 
(-1.1455) 
CHW 
 
0.0555 
(0.0597) 
 -0.0871 
(-0.0911) 
KC 
 
-1.5506 
(-1.6449) 
 -1.3792 
(-1.4404) 
CLE 
 
-2.1630** 
(-2.0196) 
 -2.1687* 
(-1.8324) 
DET 
 
0.7148 
(0.5328) 
 0.7145 
(0.5504) 
MIN 
 
-0.5428 
(-0.4557) 
 -0.2703 
(-0.2284) 
LAA  0.9547  1.4388 
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(0.6226) (0.9404) 
TEX 
 
-0.7238 
(-0.7834) 
 -0.9882 
(-1.0374) 
HOU 
 
-0.6820 
(-0.5330) 
 -0.1983 
(-0.1593) 
OAK 
 
-1.2416 
(-1.1862) 
 -1.1609 
(-1.1419) 
SEA 
 
-1.9988** 
(-2.4226) 
 -2.2714*** 
(-2.7329) 
NYM 
 
-0.9811 
(-0.9708) 
 -0.9383 
(-0.9388) 
ATL 
 
-1.3288 
(-1.2167) 
 -0.8858 
(-0.8333) 
MIA 
 
0.8619 
(0.6959) 
 1.2647 
(0.9363) 
PHI 
 
0.3787 
(0.2923) 
 0.3426 
(0.2713) 
WAS 
 
-0.1541 
(-0.1158) 
 -0.0930 
(-0.0715) 
CIN 
 
-1.0718 
(-1.1463) 
 -1.0545 
(-1.1574) 
STL 
 
1.0351 
(0.9162) 
 0.9194 
(0.8120) 
CHC 
 
0.1120 
(0.1109) 
 0.1416 
(0.1629) 
MIL 
 
0.7599 
(0.6442) 
 0.5420 
(0.4641) 
PIT 
 
-1.2382 
(-1.4015) 
 -0.9598 
(-1.1052) 
SF 
 
-0.7569 
(-0.7285) 
 -0.5471 
(-0.5137) 
SD 
 
-2.1183** 
(-2.5038) 
 -2.3264*** 
(-2.7743) 
LAD 
 
-0.2136 
(-0.2108) 
 -0.0936 
(-0.0968) 
ARI 
 
-0.4295 
(-0.4593) 
 -0.6470 
(-0.6943) 
     
R2 0.6208 0.5938 0.5824 0.6211 
Adjusted R2 0.5991 0.5370 0.5444 0.5520 
All results in Table 1 reflect Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. 
 
Table 2: Present Value Per Year Results 
Pitchers Only 
 Teams, Teams Agents Teams, 
30 
 
Agents Not 
Included 
Included, 
Agents Not 
Included, 
Teams Not 
Agents 
Included 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Constant 
1.9374 
(0.2887) 
-1.1718 
(-0.1564) 
-0.7639 
(-0.1121) 
-2.7707 
(-0.3695) 
WAR 
1.4585*** 
(18.9428) 
1.4731*** 
(15.4595) 
1.5229*** 
(20.3391) 
1.4351*** 
(15.1792) 
Age 
-0.0078 
(-0.0197) 
0.1918 
(0.4553) 
0.1684 
(0.4154) 
0.3037 
(0.6904) 
Age^2 
-0.0010 
(-0.1628) 
-0.0046 
(-0.7397) 
-0.0039 
(-0.6365) 
-0.0066 
(-0.9883) 
Re-sign 
0.4815 
(1.4324) 
0.6456 
(1.5354) 
0.5662* 
(1.6620) 
0.6046 
(1.3616) 
2003-2004 
-0.1033 
(-0.1047) 
0.3850 
(0.3701) 
-0.3821 
(-0.3824) 
0.1822 
(0.1470) 
2004-2005 
0.3238 
(0.3319) 
0.6149 
(0.6164) 
0.3264 
(0.3320) 
0.4769 
(0.3722) 
2005-2006 
0.6598 
(0.6620) 
0.8942 
(0.9144) 
0.2649 
(0.2617) 
0.4682 
(0.3716) 
2006-2007 
2.0765** 
(2.1612) 
2.6341*** 
(2.6285) 
2.0206** 
(2.0859) 
2.4496* 
(1.9396) 
2007-2008 
2.3008** 
(2.3923) 
2.8096** 
(2.5638) 
2.3921** 
(2.4490) 
2.7844** 
(2.0866) 
2008-2009 
2.2721** 
(2.3844) 
2.4183** 
(2.4378) 
2.0286** 
(2.1025) 
2.1845* 
(1.7365) 
2009-2010 
2.8811*** 
(3.0441) 
2.9633*** 
(2.9285) 
2.6833*** 
(2.7946) 
2.8744** 
(2.3039) 
2010-2011 
2.0198** 
(2.2028) 
2.2028** 
(2.2236) 
2.0475** 
(2.2069) 
2.2697* 
(1.8425) 
2011-2012 
2.5917*** 
(2.8222) 
2.8177*** 
(2.7808) 
2.6117*** 
(2.8073) 
2.8902** 
(2.2806) 
Oct 
0.6046 
(0.4942) 
0.4120 
(0.3400) 
0.2350 
(0.1876) 
0.3316 
(0.2338) 
Nov 
0.3528 
(0.4036) 
0.5136 
(0.6533) 
0.3801 
(0.4327) 
0.5176 
(0.6235) 
Dec 
0.3394 
(0.8287) 
0.3785 
(0.5062) 
0.3065 
(0.3682) 
0.4187 
(0.5259) 
Jan 
-0.3114 
(-0.3784) 
-0.2996 
(-0.3749) 
-0.6620 
(-0.8029) 
-0.6063 
(-0.7817) 
Feb 
-0.5101 
(-0.5814) 
-0.3948 
(-0.4720) 
-0.9687 
(-1.0975) 
-0.7347 
(-0.8203) 
Mar 
0.5495 
(0.5895) 
0.6582 
(0.7997) 
0.4224 
(0.4532) 
0.5377 
(0.6335) 
Apr 
0.5978 
(0.6429) 
0.3508 
(0.4024) 
0.4209 
(0.4529) 
0.5658 
(0.6604) 
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Years to Free 
Agency 
-1.0988*** 
(-6.0046) 
-1.1483*** 
(-6.0857) 
-1.0721*** 
(-5.7865) 
-1.0319*** 
(-5.0848) 
No Trade 
Clause 
1.8011*** 
(3.5490) 
  
 
Boras, Scott 
 
 
1.8492*** 
(3.3864) 
2.2015*** 
(4.0941) 
Clifton, Gregg 
 
 
1.5466* 
(1.9170) 
1.2732 
(1.3794) 
Genske, Greg 
 
 
0.6646 
(0.9048) 
0.3915 
(0.4835) 
Hendricks, 
Randy & Alan 
 
 
1.2287** 
(2.0003) 
0.7161 
(1.0114) 
Horwits, Dan 
 
 
0.8995 
(1.1681) 
0.9707 
(1.2833) 
Landry, Greg 
 
 
-0.3238 
(-0.3213) 
-0.0623 
(-0.1349) 
Levinson, 
Sam & Seth 
 
 
-0.1863 
(-0.3143) 
-0.2937 
(-0.4713) 
Meister, Barry 
 
 
-0.0144 
(-0.0217) 
0.2213 
(0.3092) 
Nero, Alan 
 
 
0.3386 
(0.3570) 
1.0457 
(1.1127) 
Thurman, 
Rick 
 
 
2.7559*** 
(3.2711) 
2.9648** 
(2.3230) 
NYY 
 1.6276 
(1.3946) 
 1.6639 
(1.5344) 
BOS 
 0.3471 
(0.4449) 
 0.6618 
(0.7613) 
TB 
 -0.5653 
(-0.6406) 
 -0.5206 
(-0.5117) 
TOR 
 -0.1986 
(-0.2740) 
 0.0850 
(0.1163) 
BAL 
 -0.4311 
(-0.4318) 
 -0.7388 
(-0.9264) 
CHW 
 0.2735 
(0.3642) 
 0.2276 
(0.3132) 
KC 
 -0.7466 
(-0.8274) 
 -1.1513 
(-1.1559) 
CLE 
 -0.3154 
(-0.3130) 
 -0.3536 
(-0.3883) 
DET 
 1.1345 
(1.3617) 
 1.1719 
(1.1688) 
MIN 
 -0.3941 
(-0.4418) 
 -0.2121 
(-0.2647) 
LAA 
 0.0309 
(0.0352) 
 -0.0092 
(-0.0111) 
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TEX 
 -0.1118 
(-0.0953) 
 -0.4734 
(-0.4709) 
HOU 
 0.0298 
(0.0357) 
 0.2537 
(0.2897) 
OAK 
 1.2351 
(0.9847) 
 1.0373 
(0.7677) 
SEA 
 -0.4745 
(-0.4865) 
 -0.6044 
(-0.6259) 
NYM 
 0.8724 
(0.8877) 
 0.7386 
(0.8028) 
ATL 
 1.3784 
(1.4885) 
 1.2927 
(1.4281) 
MIA 
 1.6251 
(1.2891) 
 1.6644 
(1.3445) 
PHI 
 0.0275 
(0.0276) 
 0.1064 
(0.1096) 
WAS 
 -0.7593 
(-0.9153) 
 -1.0789 
(-1.3120) 
CIN 
 0.2765 
(0.2954) 
 0.1247 
(0.1444) 
STL 
 0.1285 
(0.1571) 
 -0.0282 
(-0.0353) 
CHC 
 -0.3617 
(-0.4876) 
 -0.1826 
(-0.2334) 
MIL 
 1.1510 
(0.9869) 
 0.4600 
(0.4750) 
PIT 
 -0.6567 
(-0.7520) 
 -0.6880 
(-0.7597) 
SF 
 0.6466 
(0.6701) 
 0.3962 
(0.4311) 
SD 
 0.0568 
(0.0724) 
 -0.6945 
(-0.9016) 
LAD 
 0.4961 
(0.5529) 
 0.4468 
(0.5738) 
ARI 
 0.5143 
(0.5451) 
 0.3417 
(0.3622) 
     
R2 0.6266 0.6388 0.6426 0.6695 
Adjusted R2 0.6016 0.5788 0.6080 0.6013 
In table 2, “Teams Included, Agents Not” results reflect Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors, and “Teams, Agents Included” results reflect White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
Table 3: Present Value Per Year Results 
Hitters and Pitchers Together 
 Teams, Teams Agents Teams, 
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Agents Not 
Included 
Included, 
Agents Not 
Included, 
Teams Not 
Agents 
Included 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Constant 
4.4899 
(0.8780) 
3.2871 
(0.6079) 
2.8926 
(0.5516) 
4.0448 
(0.7327) 
WAR 
1.2839*** 
(21.7969) 
1.3919*** 
(23.4632) 
1.3694*** 
(22.7196) 
1.3405*** 
(22.4936) 
Age 
-0.2371 
(-0.7589) 
-0.1220 
(-0.3800) 
-0.1253 
(-0.3911) 
-0.1639 
(-0.4977) 
Age^2 
0.0026 
(0.5532) 
0.0008 
(0.1728) 
0.0011 
(0.2166) 
0.0016 
(0.3158) 
Re-sign 
0.6820** 
(2.4638) 
0.6528** 
(2.3082) 
0.8075*** 
(2.6901) 
0.7135** 
(2.3995) 
2003-2004 
0.5093 
(0.9047) 
0.1867 
(0.3132) 
0.1204 
(0.2176) 
-0.0280 
(-0.047) 
2004-2005 
1.0350* 
(1.7525) 
0.9469 
(1.5229) 
0.8829 
(1.5078) 
0.7219 
(1.1764) 
2005-2006 
1.5774*** 
(2.8873) 
1.3700** 
(2.3698) 
1.0872** 
(1.9948) 
1.0391* 
(1.7926) 
2006-2007 
2.4457*** 
(4.3414) 
2.5616*** 
(4.1434) 
2.2992*** 
(4.0328) 
2.2423*** 
(3.6556) 
2007-2008 
2.4652*** 
(4.1846) 
2.6184*** 
(4.0860) 
2.3717*** 
(3.7979) 
2.3514*** 
(3.6177) 
2008-2009 
2.6782*** 
(4.5014) 
2.5006*** 
(3.9850) 
2.3629*** 
(4.0519) 
2.1736*** 
(3.5503) 
2009-2010 
2.4278*** 
(4.4195) 
2.2241*** 
(3.7805) 
2.2273*** 
(3.9995) 
2.0574*** 
(3.5154) 
2010-2011 
2.5691*** 
(4.8682) 
2.3277*** 
(4.1157) 
2.1652*** 
(4.0100) 
2.0477*** 
(3.5492) 
2011-2012 
2.5751*** 
(4.7327) 
2.3682*** 
(4.0481) 
2.3680*** 
(4.2100) 
2.2296*** 
(3.7436) 
Oct 
0.4179 
(0.4075) 
0.3096 
(0.3022) 
0.5110 
(0.5163) 
0.2068 
0.2061) 
Nov 
0.2963 
(0.5584) 
0.0462* 
(0.0863) 
0.0998 
(0.1908) 
-0.0108 
(-0.0195) 
Dec 
0.6341 
(1.2260) 
0.2325 
(0.4468) 
0.3914 
(0.7870) 
0.1512 
(0.2839) 
Jan 
0.1082 
(0.2096) 
-0.2383 
(-0.4560) 
-0.4915 
(-0.9872) 
-0.5705 
(-1.0615) 
Feb 
0.3028 
(0.5117) 
-0.0721 
(-0.1203) 
-0.2550 
(-0.4387) 
-0.4075 
(-.06608) 
Mar 
1.0334* 
(1.8133) 
0.9828 
(1.6020) 
0.7290 
(1.2629) 
0.7139 
(1.1450) 
Apr 
1.2598** 
(2.0636) 
1.0769 
(1.6269) 
0.8317 
(1.3312) 
0.8719 
(1.3189) 
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Years to Free 
Agency 
-1.0084*** 
(-7.675) 
-1.0555*** 
(-7.4661) 
-1.0358*** 
(-7.2272) 
-0.9832*** 
(-6.6522) 
No Trade 
Clause 
3.0205*** 
(6.8360) 
 
  
Boras, Scott 
  1.6972*** 
(3.7155) 
1.7877*** 
(3.9698) 
Clifton, Gregg 
  1.5312** 
(2.0523) 
1.5046** 
(2.0093) 
Close, Casey 
  0.4517 
(0.4887) 
0.4754 
(0.5119) 
Cohen, Paul 
  0.8017 
(1.0625) 
0.4770 
(0.6205) 
Garber, Bob 
  -1.1267* 
(-1.8222) 
-0.8076 
(-1.3069) 
Genske, Greg 
  1.3356** 
(1.9758) 
1.1734 
(1.6402) 
Goldschmidt, 
Eric 
  -1.1493** 
(-2.4310) 
-1.2807** 
(-2.1981) 
Greenberg, 
Peter 
  -0.1969 
(-0.2278) 
-0.6151 
(-0.7299) 
Hendricks, 
Randy & Alan 
  0.8139 
(1.3162) 
0.3726 
(0.6067) 
Hilliard, Steve 
  1.0281 
(1.1549) 
0.9888 
(1.0084) 
Horwits, Dan 
  0.4955 
(1.0022) 
0.5470 
(0.9981) 
Katz, Adam 
  -0.2454 
(-0.3480) 
-0.3939 
(-0.5468) 
Kinzer, Paul 
  0.6414 
(1.0495) 
0.6420 
(1.0623) 
Landry, Greg 
  1.9301** 
(2.0387) 
1.9623** 
(2.0152) 
Levinson, 
Sam & Seth 
  -0.1490 
(-0.4665) 
-0.2542 
(-0.7431) 
Lozano, Dan 
  1.0258 
(1.4555) 
0.9714 
(1.3725) 
Meister, Barry 
  0.5480 
(1.0311) 
0.7261 
(1.3684) 
Moye, 
Michael 
  1.1756* 
(1.8687) 
1.0520 
(1.5762) 
Nero, Alan 
  -0.2940 
(-0.3716) 
-0.2082 
(-0.2478) 
Peters, Brian 
  0.6502 
(0.7585) 
0.8621 
(0.9929) 
Reynolds, 
Larry 
  -0.1985 
(-0.2215) 
-0.5865 
(-0.6521) 
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SFX 
  -0.7855 
(-1.3305) 
-0.9764* 
(-1.7678) 
Tellem, Arn 
  0.1931 
(0.2766) 
-0.0034 
(-0.0043) 
Wasserman 
Media Group 
  -1.1336** 
(-2.0264) 
-0.9014 
(-1.4014) 
NYY 
 0.7926 
(1.0651) 
 0.6922 
(0.9278) 
BOS 
 -0.3541 
(-0.5661) 
 -0.2736 
(-0.4438) 
TB 
 -1.1583 
(-1.3712) 
 -1.3051 
(-1.5109) 
TOR 
 -0.6677 
(-1.2960) 
 -0.5262 
(-1.0161) 
BAL 
 -1.0812* 
(-1.7066) 
 -0.6556 
(-1.0927) 
CHW 
 0.0300 
(0.0539) 
 -0.0643 
(-0.1076) 
KC 
 -0.9605 
(-1.5264) 
 -0.9857 
(-1.5181) 
CLE 
 -1.1485* 
(-1.6614) 
 -1.2276* 
(-1.8697) 
DET 
 0.8651 
(0.9993) 
 0.8915 
(0.9943) 
MIN 
 -0.4014 
(-0.6139) 
 -0.1764 
(-0.2684) 
LAA 
 0.5752 
(0.6977) 
 0.9309 
(1.1254) 
TEX 
 -0.2304 
(-0.3365) 
 -0.5235 
(-0.7419) 
HOU 
 -0.2480 
(-0.3460) 
 -0.0101 
(-0.0139) 
OAK 
 -0.2783 
(-0.3529) 
 -0.2070 
(-0.2615) 
SEA 
 -1.3777** 
(-2.1639) 
 -1.3945** 
(-2.0821) 
NYM 
 0.2142 
(0.2982) 
 0.1486 
(0.2020) 
ATL 
 0.2339 
(-0.2940) 
 0.2490 
(0.3245) 
MIA 
 1.1507 
(1.2969) 
 1.5501* 
(1.7346) 
PHI 
 0.3360 
(0.4206) 
 0.2688 
(0.3637) 
WAS 
 -0.1704 
(-0.2272) 
 -0.0906 
(-0.1218) 
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CIN 
 -0.3775 
(-0.6030) 
 -0.2752 
(-0.4629) 
STL 
 0.5668 
(0.8682) 
 0.2617 
(0.3936) 
CHC 
 -0.0359 
(-0.0600) 
 -0.2954 
(-0.4799) 
MIL 
 0.8548 
(1.0928) 
 0.7683 
(1.0219) 
PIT 
 -0.9741* 
(-1.7311) 
 -0.9380 
(-1.6262) 
SF 
 0.0598 
(0.0842) 
 0.0970 
(0.1327) 
SD 
 -0.7960 
(-1.3780) 
 -0.9524 
(-1.6222) 
LAD 
 0.1137 
(0.1843) 
 0.0943 
(0.1586) 
ARI 
 -0.2381 
(-0.3949) 
 -0.4529 
(-0.7272) 
     
R2 0.5952 0.5809 0.5893 0.6109 
Adjusted R2 0.5831 0.5514 0.5634 0.5689 
All results in Table 3 reflect White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
 
Performance Measure: WAR 
 As seen in the regression results above, a player’s performance statistic, 
represented by WAR, is statistically significant at the 1% level in all results. On 
average, players make approximately an additional $1.3 million per year for each 
additional win they can earn for their team according to WAR. This figure tends 
to be slightly higher for pitchers, which leads to the conclusion that teams are 
valuing quality pitching higher than hitting success. This is consistent with the 
baseball mantra of “good pitching beats good hitting” and shows evidence of 
scarcity of quality pitching in comparison to quality hitting. Young pitchers often 
are more susceptible to injury, especially to their pitching elbow and shoulder 
because of the physical stress placed in those areas of their bodies. Comparatively, 
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young hitters encounter far fewer serious or career-threatening injuries, which 
makes established pitchers more valuable. Subsequently, when a team needs a 
pitcher they may be more apt to sign a player outside the organization, whereas 
when a team needs a hitter they may be more willing to give a young minor 
leaguer with potential a chance to take the roster spot. To illustrate, another 
version of Table 1 breaks down WAR into its four components: batting, 
baserunning, fielding, and positional. 
Table 4: Results With WAR Broken Down Into Components 
Excerpt of Results with Same Variables as Table 1 
 Teams, Agents Included 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Batting 
0.1613*** 
(15.8900) 
Baserunning 
0.1176** 
(2.4696) 
Fielding 
0.0179 
(0.9047) 
Positional 
0.0030 
(0.1012) 
 
 Table 4 illustrates the relationships between different aspects of a player’s 
performance and his salary. Batting values have the largest coefficient, followed 
by baserunning, fielding, and positional variables respectively. Batting and 
baserunning are also statistically significant, while fielding and positional are not. 
Unsurprisingly, this shows that teams put the highest emphasis on a player’s 
hitting ability when signing contracts, followed closely by baserunning. These are 
two values that are easily measured in statistics such as batting average, home 
runs, and stolen bases, as well as many more advanced statistics. On the other 
hand, while there is clear value in players who are quality fielders and play 
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difficult positions, these factors are more difficult to measure and seem to be 
secondary in contract negotiations between players and teams.  
Agents could use this information to try to represent players who are better 
hitters and baserunners rather than fielders. Conversely, teams could employ a 
strategy to obtain the best fielders and acquire talent at rare positions because 
these players may be underpaid compared to players whose value derive from 
their hitting ability. 
 
Age 
 The relationship between age and salary is not a linear relationship. In 
order to fix this problem, age is represented by the binomial age plus age squared. 
As players age, they typically reach their peak performance in their late twenties 
and begin to decline in their early thirties. However, due to service time rules 
outlined in Chapter 2, they typically don’t become free agents until at least their 
late twenties. Typically when players are younger, and more desirable due to not 
having reached their peak performance level yet, they are solely under their 
team’s control, and don’t have an open market to sell their services. This results in 
lower salaries for much younger players. Once players do reach free agency, 
though, younger players are more desirable and will likely earn higher salaries 
due to lower injury skill deterioration risks. These young free agents are typically 
in their late twenties. Therefore, the youngest players tend to receive lower 
salaries due to a restricted market before free agency, followed by players who are 
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free agents at the most desirable age, followed by a decline based on the aging 
process. 
 
Re-Sign 
 As previously discussed, the re-sign variable is intended to capture any 
possible “home-town discounts.” Surprisingly, the results show the exact opposite. 
When evaluating salaries of all MLB players, the data reveals that re-signing with 
the same team has a positive and statistically significant relationship with salary. 
Instead of the player taking a discount to remain with his previous team, the 
organization is paying a premium to keep the player from exploring other options 
on the open market. This could be a function of players negotiating with their 
current employer first, and the teams overpaying in order to discourage the player 
from seeking any other offers. It could also be due to players giving their former 
team a final chance to top another team’s offer before signing, resulting in the 
former team overcompensating.  
 Interestingly, this relationship between re-signing with the former team 
and earning a higher salary is much stronger for hitters than for pitchers. This 
could be due to pitchers being re-signed to long term extensions long before free 
agency. If the majority of pitchers re-sign with their team, they should not expect 
to earn as much of this premium as hitters would expect to earn on the free agent 
market. This dichotomy could be a result of teams wanting to lock in their best 
pitchers to long-term contracts at a young age due to the scarcity of quality 
pitchers. 
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Years 
 Each offseason variable in the tables above are in comparison to the 2002-
2003 offseason. As expected, there is a general upward trend in salaries that 
players sign for as time goes on. This is due to the overall economics of MLB 
increasing the amount that teams are willing to spend on payroll as a whole, 
including substantial increases in television rights revenues, and increased 
attendance coupled with escalating ticket prices. 
 A large jump in salaries appears to occur in the 2006-2007 offseason. The 
2006-2007 offseason saw the largest outlier in all contracts included in the data 
for this report: starting pitcher Barry Zito signed with the San Francisco Giants 
for seven years, guaranteeing him $126 million ($92 million present value at the 
time), and was vastly overpaid. Chicago Cubs outfielder Alfonso Soriano also 
signed a $136 million contract over eight years ($93 million present value at the 
time), and the organization is still trying to trade him to rid itself of the last two 
years and $36 million left on his contract. This seemed to start a trend of talented 
players getting paid salaries that only elite players would previously receive, 
simply because they were the best players on the free agent market, rather than 
being deserving of the elite money. 
 Another offseason that saw higher than average salaries was the 2008-
2009 offseason, famous for the New York Yankees signing three of the top free 
agents: starting pitchers CC Sabathia and A.J. Burnett, and first baseman Mark 
Teixeira. All three of them were paid very handsomely. They set the bar very high 
41 
 
for comparable players of the offseason. Furthermore, the Yankees were 
interested in seemingly every free agent that offseason after missing the playoffs, 
which likely drove up the prices for others simply because the Yankees, 
baseball’s wealthiest and most lavish team, were interested. However, the 
short=term benefit of the lavish spending led the Yankees to win the 2009 World 
Series, and one could argue that their return on investment paid immediate 
dividends. 
 
Months 
 Although the majority of the results for the months of the year are not 
statistically significant, we can still garner valuable information from their 
relationships with salaries, with all results for months being compared to 
September. The months included are those in the offseason, and immediately 
prior to and after the offseason (September and April, respectively).  
 December, March, and April have the highest coefficients, but for vastly 
different reasons. In March and April, the season is about to start or has just 
started, and the majority of players signing contracts are typically star players 
who are signing multi-year extensions to stay with their team; or young players 
who are signing long term extensions after arbitration hearings. They are often 
approaching free agency eligibility, and teams are willing to pay them very well 
in order to shed the risk of losing them to free agency after the season. An 
example of this can be seen with Cincinnati Reds All-Star first baseman Joey 
Votto. In April of 2012, Votto, one of the game’s best young hitters, was set to 
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earn $9.5 million, followed by $17 million in 2013, after which he would be 
eligible for free agency (Euston, 2013). Rather than face the uncertainty of Votto 
leaving after 2013, and having to compete for his services with an open market, 
the Reds and Votto agreed to a massive extension in April 2012 that will keep 
Votto under contract until at least 2023. The deal gives Votto guaranteed financial 
security, and gives the Reds the stability to know they will not have to compete 
with other teams to sign Votto as a free agent for at least another decade. 
 On the other hand, in December, almost every contract signed was a free 
agent either re-signing with his previous team or moving to a new organization. 
December is in the middle of baseball’s offseason, and is one of the most active 
times for negotiating and signing player contracts. Every December, Major 
League Baseball hosts its annual four day Winter Meetings, which is a gathering 
of all the general managers of the 30 MLB teams, along with most of the 
prominent agents. This is the time for many free agents to reach agreements on 
their next contracts. However, is it a wise strategy for free agents to sign contracts 
at the winter meetings? Or, should they try to establish the market value before 
the winter meetings? Perhaps they should choose to wait out the rest of the market 
and sign after the new year begins in January (a favorite negotiating strategy of 
well-known agent Scott Boras). 
The data suggests that on average, the winter meetings is the best time for 
agents to finalize new contracts for their clients. Many bidding wars between 
teams occur at the winter meetings, which could help foster an environment in 
which players maximize their salaries. On the other hand, this also suggests that 
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teams can seek bargain contracts before the winter meetings at the start of the 
offseason in November, and after the winter meetings leading up to the start of 
spring training in February. 
 
Years to Free Agency 
 As expected, the length of time that a player has remaining until he is 
eligible to become a free agent has a negative relationship with the value of the 
contract he is signing. This financial impact is statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all sets of results. If two equal players are signing new contracts, and one 
is a free agent while the other is bound to his current team for another year prior 
to becoming a free agent, basic economic theory tells us that the player who can 
sell his services to more teams will generate more demand for his services. This 
enhances negotiating leverage and creates a higher market value for his services. 
The more time a player is under a single team’s control before free agency 
eligibility, the more of a salary discount he will likely have to take to receive the 
financial stability of a longer contract.  
 This negative relationship between years to free agency and salary is 
significantly larger for pitchers than for hitters. This is most likely because young, 
developing pitchers exude much more variance in their performances than hitters. 
A team is taking on more risk by giving a pitcher a contract extension, so the 
pitcher will have to take more a discount to convince the team to extend his 
contract. Additionally, pitchers are more susceptible to injury than hitters due to 
the unnatural motion of throwing a baseball, let alone strenuously throwing a 
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baseball about one hundred times every five days. This also likely contributes to 
the bigger discount required for pitchers signing extensions before free agency. 
 
No Trade Clause 
 All else equal, it was expected that a no trade clause would have a 
negative relationship with salaries. A no trade clause is a section negotiated into a 
contract which prohibits the team from trading the player to another team without 
his approval. This clause has value to the player, so I would expect a player’s 
salary to be lower in exchange for the inclusion of a no-trade clause. As 
previously stated, a no trade clause is only included as a variable when agents and 
teams are excluded, due the inherent use of no trade clauses in teams’ and agents’ 
strategies. 
However, the results show statistically significant and highly positive 
relationships between no trade clauses and salaries. This is likely because only the 
best players have enough leverage to command a no trade clause in a contract 
negotiation.  
Tables 1 and 3 support this conclusion because in each of those tables, the 
relationship between WAR and salary is lowest for the only column in which no 
trade clause is included as a variable, leading to my belief that the no trade clause 
variable is showing a higher salary from players who also have very high WAR 
numbers. These are elite, All-Star caliber players. The results are similar in Table 
2, with the relationship between WAR and salary the second lowest in the column 
with no-trade clause included. 
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Agents 
 In baseball, Scott Boras is known as the agent who is superior to all others. 
He is known to negotiate the highest salaried contracts for his clients. Some teams 
are unwilling to negotiate with him because of his shrewd negotiation skills. He 
represents a wide variety of players, from superstars hitting free agency to role 
players going through arbitration. The data presented suggests that Boras is, in 
fact, living up to this reputation. In Table 3, with both pitchers and hitters 
included in the sample, Boras has the second highest coefficients of all agents 
included (agents with at least 10 contracts signed in the sample are included as 
variables), and they are all statistically significant at the 1% level. These results 
suggest that the “Boras Effect” may be worth as much as almost $2 million per 
year for player contracts, certainly justifying the percentage of salary fee that a 
player would have to pay him for his negotiating services. 
 One of Boras’s well-known tactics is to wait out the market and sign 
contracts in January or even February. Rarely does a Boras client sign at the 
winter meetings or earlier. While this data suggests that signing at the winter 
meetings is most likely to be the time to earn the greatest salary, Boras is a master 
of waiting until the time is right for his clients, by measuring the interest that 
teams have in his clients and evaluating the overall market. He often advises his 
clients not to sign contract extensions prior to reaching free agency, believing he 
will be able to maximize their value on the open market. He has represented some 
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of baseball’s best players like Alex Rodriguez, Greg Maddux, Manny Ramirez, 
Prince Fielder, and Mark Teixeira. 
 Surprisingly, Greg Landry tops the list of agents’ coefficients when both 
hitters and pitchers are included, even higher than Boras. Data suggests that he is 
worth just slightly below $2 million per year, with statistical significance at the 
5% level. However, when we look at pitchers only, his results are negative, and he 
does not have enough contracts with hitters to qualify for results with hitters only.  
Landry has two high-profile clients in starting pitcher Roy Halladay and 
first baseman Ryan Howard, both All-Stars for the Philadelphia Phillies (Agency 
Database, 2013). Halladay could contribute to Landry’s negative coefficient for 
pitchers, because in all three contracts he has signed for Halladay, he has agreed 
to take less money to sign an extension with his current team before reaching free 
agency (Euston, 2013). This is no fault of Landry, for he was just listening to his 
client’s desires to lock in long-term financial security, avoid a distraction of an 
expiring contract, and stay with his current team.  
Howard, on the other hand, could boost Landry’s overall results to the 
coefficient approaching $2 million. Landry has negotiated two large, record-
setting extensions for Howard with the Phillies, that don’t seem to be justified 
based on his WAR from the seasons prior to the extensions (3.0 and 4.6, 
respectively) (FanGraphs, 2013). He is a very productive player, but not worth the 
monstrous contract extensions that Landry was able to negotiate for him. Landry 
has not shown nearly as much versatility as Boras, and these Ryan Howard 
contracts are the likely source of his outstanding results.  
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 Gregg Clifton is next on the list for overall players, with a coefficient of 
about $1.5 million that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The relationship 
is very similar when we look at pitchers alone. Clifton does not have enough 
contracts signed for batters to qualify for the results for hitters alone. His primary 
clients have been pitchers Tom Glavine, Mark Mulder, Bronson Arroyo, and 
outfielder Luis Gonzalez, which shows he has the ability to work for elite players 
like Glavine and Gonzalez, or more average players like Mulder and Arroyo 
(Agency Database, 2013). He has been very versatile in having them sign early or 
late in the offseason, and in both signing extensions and reaching free agent 
markets. Evidently, Clifton has a great ability to read the market and adjust his 
strategies to fit each specific client. 
 Greg Genske has a coefficient of about $1.3 million for overall players 
with statistical significance at the 5% level when teams are not included as 
variables. The relationship is less significant when teams are included, which 
could be evidence that Genske has particularly positive relationships with specific 
teams. Of his 19 contracts signed, six of them have been with the Yankees and 
Red Sox, who are both known to be very willing to spend significant money on 
player contracts (Euston, 2013). This shows that Genske most likely either has a 
good working relationship with their front offices, or, more likely, he has 
leveraged a strategy of keeping the Yankees and Red Sox very involved in his 
negotiations, resulting in these two teams being willing to overpay for his free 
agents. Genske also seems to specialize in representing hitters, where his 
relationship with salaries is statistically significant at the 10% level and worth 
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about $1.75 million, whereas with just pitchers his coefficient is around $0.6 
million and not statistically significant. The only elite player he represents is 
Yankees pitcher CC Sabathia, which makes his results for hitters even more 
impressive (Agency Database, 2013).  
 On the other hand, Eric Goldshmidt’s results are worse than negative one 
with statistical significance at the 5% level. Looking at the contracts he has signed, 
he does not have any big-name clients, which could inherently drive down his 
relationship with his clients’ salaries (Agency Database, 2013). Additionally, 
many of his clients’ contracts were signed early in the offseason, before the winter 
meetings. Of the eleven contracts he was responsible for, nine of which were free 
agents. Of those nine, six were signed in November. Goldshmidt likely would be 
better off pursuing a more patient strategy in which he waits until at least the start 
of December to sign his clients to contracts with their new teams.  
 Looking at only pitchers, Boras and Clifton have statistically significant 
relationships, but Rick Thurman stands out far beyond them, worth almost $3 
million per year with statistical significance at the 5% level. Thurman only 
represents pitchers, with his only clients in this sample being starting pitcher Tim 
Lincecum, and closers Trevor Hoffman, and Brian Fuentes (Agency Database, 
2013). Of the nine contracts he has signed, only three have been in free agency, 
making Thurman a good fit for pitchers who have a desire to gain long term 
financial flexibility by signing extensions with their current team.  
 Thurman has done terrific work for Tim Lincecum, setting a record for 
someone entering into their first year of arbitration eligibility, signing a two year 
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contract which paid $10 million followed by $13 million (Euston, 2013). After 
that contract expired, entering into Lincecum’s final season of arbitration, he 
landed another two year extension paying him $18.5 million followed by $22 
million. These are terrific salaries for players to earn in their arbitration eligible 
seasons.  
 The value of contracts Thurman negotiated for Fuentes and Hoffman, on 
the other hand, give Thurman credit for what, in reality, is a product of both teams’ 
high valuation of “closers” and my methodology of using WAR as the statistic to 
represent players’ on-field performance. In baseball, when a team has a small lead 
(one to three runs) in the ninth inning, they typically utilize a specialized relief 
pitcher known as the “closer” to get the final three outs of close games. Like other 
relief pitchers, the closer usually only pitches one inning or less. Usually, he is the 
best relief pitcher on the team. Each time he closes out a game with a three run 
lead or less, he earns a stat known as a save.  
Saves are not included in the WAR computation, which values a closer 
just as much as a reliever with the same stats who would pitch the eighth inning 
rather than the ninth (FanGraphs, 2013). However, the closer earns many saves, 
which are greatly valued by teams when negotiating contracts. Trevor Hoffman 
and Brian Fuentes are both closers. WAR doesn’t recognize the save statistic and 
thus, my methodology of using WAR values these players much lower than teams 
do, because teams like to have players who earn saves. Therefore, my 
methodology is giving credit to Rick Thurman for negotiating contracts for 
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Hoffman and Fuentes when in reality, these players are getting paid for their saves 
which WAR doesn’t consider.  
Looking at results for hitters only, Boras and Genske stand out yet again. 
However, Dan Lozano also has a coefficient of approximately $1.4 million with 
statistical significance at the 10% level. Lozano’s best skill may be his ability to 
recruit clients who are truly all-star caliber and elite level players, including first 
basemen Albert Pujols and Joey Votto, outfielder Carlos Beltran, and third 
baseman Alex Rodriguez (Agency Database, 2013). However, these results 
suggest that he does a great job utilizing excellent contract negotiation skills.  
Lozano has shown a great ability to both sign favorable contract 
extensions as well as free agent contracts. In the section about monthly effects, I 
referenced a massive contract extension that kept Joey Votto with the Reds 
through 2023. This extension was negotiated by Dan Lozano, who was able to 
negotiate this huge contract a full three years before Votto was due to become a 
free agent. He also negotiated a $100 million contract extension for Albert Pujols 
with the Cardinals, also three years before Pujols would become a free agent, 
followed by a $250 million free agent contract with the Angels after the previous 
extension expired (Euston, 2013). 
In 2007, Alex Rodriguez had an opt-out clause in his contract with the 
New York Yankees and was represented by Scott Boras, who advised him to opt 
out of the contract so that he could secure a longer-term, higher-paying deal, even 
though the Yankees threatened to end all negotiations with Rodriguez if he did so 
(Euston, 2013). After Rodriguez opted out and the Yankees left the negotiation 
51 
 
table, Rodriguez fired Boras and hired Lozano, who helped to not only bring the 
Yankees back to the table to negotiate a contract for Rodriguez, but secured a 
record setting $275 million contract for him over ten seasons (with the possibility 
of it reaching $305 million based on bonuses for setting home run records), 
showing remarkable ability to negotiate favorable terms on a contract in which the 
Yankees initially proclaimed they wanted no part of. These are just a few of the 
examples of the great durability that Dan Lozano has shown in representing his 
clients and securing them with very favorable contracts.  
Contrastingly, Bob Garber shows a negative relationship of about $1.3 
million that is statistically significant at the 5% level when teams are not included, 
and a negative relationship of about $0.75 million when teams are included, 
although it is not statistically significant. Of his eight contracts signed for hitters, 
they were all free agent contracts, and all for clients Matt Stairs and Mark Loretta, 
who have been fairly average players throughout their careers (Agency Database, 
2013). He negotiated three contracts for Matt Stairs to play for the Kansas City 
Royals, which could lead to the more negative relationship between Garber and 
his clients’ salaries when teams are not included as variables. The variable for the 
Royals shows a negative coefficient, so for the three contracts for Stairs to play 
with the Royals, the negative Royals coefficient is coming into play, resulting in 
the coefficient for Garber being not quite as low when teams are included as 
variables.  
Garber has also negotiated two contracts for pitchers, one free agent deal 
for starting pitcher C.J. Wilson and one extension for starting pitcher Roy Oswalt 
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two years prior to free agency (Euston, 2013). In the overall results for pitchers 
and hitters, Garber’s coefficients, although still negative, aren’t nearly as negative 
as in the results for only hitters. This shows that he has done a better job 
negotiating contracts for Wilson and Oswalt than for Stairs and Loretta. Wilson’s 
contract was a five year deal for $77.5 million from the Los Angeles Angels, 
which was a large contract signed during the 2011 Winter Meetings (Euston, 
2013). These results suggest that Garber should focus on getting more pitchers 
than hitters as clients in the future, while also noting that the pitchers he has 
worked with are more productive, established players than the hitters he has 
worked with. 
 
Teams 
 Looking at Table 3, the results with both hitters and pitchers included in 
the data, the Seattle Mariners have the most negative coefficient, signing players 
at almost $1.4 million below their market value per year on average, with 
statistical significance at the 5% level. This suggests that the Mariners have done 
the best job of finding players that are undervalued by the rest of Major League 
Baseball. They tend to re-sign their own players to contracts below market value, 
showing that in some cases their own players may enjoy playing there and be 
willing to take less money to stay, despite knowing that the Mariners likely won’t 
pay above market value. 
 However, when looking at only pitchers, this negative coefficient falls to 
only about $0.5 million below market value, without statistical significance, while 
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for only hitters, it is approximately $2 million below market value with statistical 
significance once again at the 5% level. This shows that the Mariners scouts and 
front office personnel may not be as proficient at evaluating pitchers, and are 
better skilled in pursuing undervalued hitters. 
 Similarly, the Cleveland Indians have a negative coefficient of 
approximately $1.2 million, with statistical significance at the 10% level, showing 
that they, too, productively sign undervalued players. They do this in a few 
different ways. First, 13 of their 19 contracts signed in the sample were re-signing 
their own players, with 11 of those 13 being contract extensions at a time when 
the player has at least one year remaining before becoming a free agent. This 
shows Cleveland’s strategy of locking up their best players years before they are 
eligible for free agency in order to sign them at a discounted price. Many smaller 
market teams attempt this strategy, knowing that once the players reach free 
agency, they won’t be able to compete with larger market teams to sign them. 
Additionally, the Indians have avoided signing players at the winter meetings. Of 
the 19 contracts signed, only one has been in the month of December, the highest 
paying month according to my analysis. They may be conscious of this trend and 
avoid signing hyped free agents at the winter meetings. 
 Similarly to Seattle, Cleveland shows an insignificant (approximately zero) 
coefficient when only pitchers are included in the sample, and a coefficient of 
more than $2 million per year below market value for contracts of only hitters. Of 
the strategies discussed above that the Indians seem to exhibit, they are very 
similar for both hitters and pitchers. Evidently, the strategies may be more 
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effective for hitters or may be executed by the team more efficiently for hitters. A 
cause of this may be the high demand and low supply for quality, young pitchers, 
resulting in less of a discount taken in order to sign contracts before free agency 
eligibility. 
 The San Diego Padres also exhibit coefficients of greater than $2 million 
per year below market value for their contracts for hitters, with statistical 
significance at the 5% level. Out of their nine contracts for hitters, only one was 
signed during December, so the Padres may be taking advantage of finding less 
prominent times to sign their contracts. However, this may be more a coincidence 
then an organizational philosophy. Six of their 13 contracts for pitchers were 
signed in December, showing that they do not shy away from signing players 
during this peak month. Additionally, they have not frequently signed hitters in 
December. Rather, the hitters that they are signing may just be inferior players 
and thus are not the hyped players that are typically signed in December. San 
Diego’s coefficient for pitcher contracts is very close to zero, and this difference 
may be due to the lower quality hitters they are signing and the fact that they are 
not signing during December. 
 Looking at Table 2, the results for only pitchers, none of the teams’ 
coefficients are statistically significant. This may be due to the high demand for 
pitching. Since pitchers tend to be at higher injury risk than hitters, their salaries 
may reflect their expected value no matter which team signs them because all of 
the teams are recognizing the inherent difficulty in finding reliable pitchers. 
However, the New York Yankees and Miami Marlins exhibit the highest 
55 
 
coefficients, each approximately $1.65 million above market value, although not 
statistically significant. 
 The high coefficient of the Yankees should not be surprising. Their 
General Manager, Brian Cashman, often states that “pitching is the key to the 
kingdom” referring to the belief that you have to have good pitchers in order to 
win (Harper, 2011). This leads to the unsurprising results showing his willingness 
to pay top dollar to secure pitchers. In December 2008, they signed starter CC 
Sabathia to a contract that was the largest ever for a pitcher at the time (Euston, 
2013). They also have given closer Mariano Rivera many large salaries, as high as 
$15 million per year, which could drive up their coefficient for pitchers similarly 
to the situation described in the agents section for Rick Thurman negotiation 
contracts for Trevor Hoffman and Brian Fuentes (Euston, 2013).  
Many would expect a similar high coefficient for the Yankees for their 
hitters, which is surprisingly slightly negative. This does not, however, mean that 
the Yankees do not spend a lot of money on hitters; they clearly do. However, 
these results do show that when they do spend large sums of money on hitters, 
they do so effectively on players who are highly productive, or have at least been 
highly productive prior to signing the contract. 
 The Marlins, on the other hand, are known for an unwillingness to spend, 
quite contrary to the Yankees. However, the results signify that when they do 
spend on pitchers, they do so ineffectively, spending too much money for the 
pitchers’ worth. Looking at the contracts they’ve signed for pitchers, six of the 
seven contracts were signed in December. Many of their hitters have been signed 
56 
 
in December as well, where their coefficient is about $1 million above market 
value, slightly lower than for pitchers. The Marlins may want to rethink their 
timing strategy, and try to sign some players at the very beginning of the 
offseason or wait out the market until after the turn of the new year. 
 Furthermore, when the Marlins are willing to spend more money, they 
have tended to do so fairly recklessly. In the 2011-2012 offseason, they were 
preparing to open a new stadium in the 2012 season, and signed shortstop Jose 
Reyes, starting pitcher Mark Buehrle, and closer Heath Bell to large contracts 
(Euston, 2013). While all three players are good, productive players, the Marlins 
were often criticized for overpaying them. Within 18 months of signing all three 
high-priced players, the Marlins traded them away because of their large contracts. 
 
Chapter 6 
Regression Results and Analysis: Number of Years 
 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss regression results with the number of years 
of the contract as the dependent variable, presented in one table with all players 
(both hitters and pitchers) included in the sample. Within the table, results will 
include regression results without teams or agents included as variables, with 
either one included, and with both included.  
Coefficients for each variable represent the relationship of that variable, 
on average, with the duration of a player’s contract (in years) for each one unit 
increase of that variable. For example, a coefficient for WAR of one would mean 
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that for every increase in one unit of WAR, a player’s contract will, on average, 
last one additional year. A negative coefficient signifies an inverse relationship, in 
which when the variable increases, the duration of the contract decreases. For 
categorical variables, like agent, each agent’s coefficient signifies the relationship 
between that agent and the duration of his clients’ contracts (in years), on average. 
The T-Statistics represent the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error. The 
higher the absolute value of the T-Statistic is, the more statistically significant the 
coefficient is. In the table, *** denotes statistical significance below 1%, ** 
denotes statistical significance below 5%, and * denotes statistical significance 
below 10%. 
Table 5: Number of Years Results 
Hitters and Pitchers Together 
 Teams, 
Agents Not 
Included 
Teams 
Included, 
Agents Not 
Agents 
Included, 
Teams Not 
Teams, 
Agents 
Included 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Coefficient 
(T-Stat) 
Constant 
2.3236 
(0.8885) 
2.7034 
(0.9592) 
2.4023 
(0.8775) 
3.4567 
(1.1933) 
WAR 
0.3691*** 
(11.6662) 
0.4230*** 
(12.4071) 
0.4286*** 
(13.9613) 
0.4307*** 
(13.7210) 
Age 
0.0655 
(0.4321) 
0.0726 
(0.4536) 
0.0732 
(0.4666) 
0.0367 
(0.2249) 
Age^2 
-0.0025 
(-1.1223) 
-0.0027 
(-1.1151) 
-0.0027 
(-1.1445) 
-0.0021 
(-0.8841) 
Re-sign 
-0.2422** 
(-2.2210) 
-0.2516** 
(-2.2221) 
-0.1975* 
(-1.6604) 
-0.2290* 
(-1.9398) 
2003-2004 
0.0752 
(0.2716) 
-0.0917 
(-0.2903) 
-0.0543 
(-0.1834) 
-0.1508 
(-0.4744) 
2004-2005 
0.0195 
(0.0701) 
0.0628 
(0.1942) 
0.1229 
(0.4056) 
0.1280 
(0.4018) 
2005-2006 
0.1868 
(0.6786) 
0.1411 
(0.4605) 
0.1449 
(0.4964) 
0.1530 
(0.4992) 
2006-2007 
0.5930** 
(2.1374) 
0.6319* 
(1.9631) 
0.6970** 
(2.2952) 
0.6516** 
(2.0100) 
2007-2008 0.6363** 0.6641** 0.7629** 0.7131** 
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(2.0988) (1.9677) (2.3785) (2.1140) 
2008-2009 
0.4846* 
(1.8492) 
0.4789 
(1.6100) 
0.5449* 
(1.9594) 
0.5525* 
(1.8830) 
2009-2010 
0.2136 
(0.8275) 
0.1471 
(0.4830) 
0.2483 
(0.8700) 
0.2003 
(0.6471) 
2010-2011 
0.5483** 
(2.1052) 
0.4567 
(1.5482) 
0.5279* 
(1.9040) 
0.4751 
(1.6212) 
2011-2012 
0.6222** 
(2.3043) 
0.5980* 
(1.9547) 
0.6237** 
(2.1759) 
0.6265** 
(2.0720) 
Oct 
-0.5498 
(-1.3006) 
-0.3123 
(-0.6837) 
-0.5557 
(-1.2953) 
-0.4019 
(-0.8808) 
Nov 
-0.2932 
(-0.8019) 
-0.2722 
(-0.6726) 
-0.4964 
(-1.3663) 
-0.4013 
(-0.9954) 
Dec 
-0.5447 
(-1.5440) 
-0.5428 
(-1.3748) 
-0.7092** 
(-1.9906) 
-0.6262 
(-1.5838) 
Jan 
-0.9471*** 
(-2.6545) 
-1.0319*** 
(-2.6096) 
-1.1351*** 
(-3.1376) 
-1.0846*** 
(-2.7423) 
Feb 
-1.0397*** 
(-2.6476) 
-1.0967** 
(-2.5246) 
-1.2261*** 
(-3.0636) 
-1.1688*** 
(-2.6944) 
Mar 
0.1939 
(0.4677) 
0.2839 
(0.6230) 
0.1005 
(0.2334) 
0.2238 
(0.4813) 
Apr 
0.6164 
(1.4089) 
0.7005 
(1.4474) 
0.4885 
(1.0938) 
0.6596 
(1.3722) 
Years to Free 
Agency 
0.3961*** 
(5.4183) 
0.3465*** 
(4.5256) 
0.3101*** 
(3.9095) 
0.3033*** 
(3.7697) 
No Trade 
Clause 
1.1535*** 
(3.9380) 
 
  
Boras, Scott 
  -0.1835 
(-0.7564) 
-0.1611 
(-0.6410) 
Clifton, Gregg 
  0.4658 
(1.3352) 
0.4427 
(1.2865) 
Close, Casey 
  -0.3461 
(-1.2007) 
-0.2964 
(-0.9988) 
Cohen, Paul 
  0.6641* 
(1.6564) 
0.5487 
(1.3976) 
Garber, Bob 
  -0.7606*** 
(-2.7942) 
-0.7049** 
(-2.5546) 
Genske, Greg 
  -0.1825 
(-0.7592) 
-0.1883 
(-0.7623) 
Goldschmidt, 
Eric 
  0.1301 
(0.3075) 
-0.0150 
(-0.0322) 
Greenberg, 
Peter 
  -0.1064 
(-0.2662) 
-0.3129 
(-0.7759) 
Hendricks, 
Randy & Alan 
  -0.5520** 
(-1.9684) 
-0.6411** 
(-2.3890) 
Hilliard, Steve   -0.5109 -0.5718 
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(-1.3634) (-1.4471) 
Horwits, Dan 
  0.4014** 
(2.0083) 
0.3479* 
(1.7254) 
Katz, Adam 
  0.1361 
(0.5479) 
0.1817 
(0.6819) 
Kinzer, Paul 
  -0.1999 
(-0.4857) 
-0.1133 
(-0.2861) 
Landry, Greg 
  0.0899 
(0.3203) 
-0.0214 
(-0.0706) 
Levinson, 
Sam & Seth 
  0.0990 
(0.6381) 
0.0639 
(0.3819) 
Lozano, Dan 
  0.5547 
(0.9417) 
0.5578 
(0.9524) 
Meister, Barry 
  0.1267 
(0.5134) 
0.1811 
(0.7261) 
Moye, 
Michael 
  -0.7502 
(-1.5546) 
-0.7683 
(-1.4883) 
Nero, Alan 
  -0.6307** 
(-1.9641) 
-0.6468* 
(-1.9329) 
Peters, Brian 
  -0.0536 
(-0.1287) 
-0.0794 
(-0.2023) 
Reynolds, 
Larry 
  -0.2854 
(-0.7628) 
-0.4151 
(-0.9895) 
SFX 
  -0.1901 
(-0.6137) 
-0.3964 
(-1.3215) 
Tellem, Arn 
  -0.3998 
(-1.3324) 
-0.3888 
(-1.2493) 
Wasserman 
Media Group 
  -0.3978* 
(-1.7060) 
-0.4215* 
(-1.6690) 
NYY 
 -0.4686 
(-1.2926) 
 -0.4461 
(-1.2266) 
BOS 
 -0.5346 
(-1.6446) 
 -0.5955* 
(-1.8014) 
TB 
 -0.4645 
(-1.0812) 
 -0.5267 
(-1.2100) 
TOR 
 -0.0300 
(-0.0942) 
 -0.0051 
(-0.0159) 
BAL 
 -0.1365 
(-0.3211) 
 -0.2098 
(-0.4925) 
CHW 
 -0.2820 
(-0.8945) 
 -0.3033 
(-0.9156) 
KC 
 -0.6696* 
(-1.9200) 
 -0.6229* 
(-1.6946) 
CLE 
 -1.0910*** 
(-2.8161) 
 -1.0607*** 
(-2.7474) 
DET  -0.2363  -0.2018 
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(-0.5936) (-0.4917) 
MIN 
 -0.5802 
(-1.4291) 
 -0.6224 
(-1.5044) 
LAA 
 -0.1544 
(-0.3624) 
 -0.0692 
(-0.1635) 
TEX 
 -0.5640 
(-1.2318) 
 -0.5536 
(-1.1987) 
HOU 
 -0.4309 
(-1.0240) 
 -0.3733 
(-0.9122) 
OAK 
 -0.3889 
(-0.9897) 
 -0.4714 
(-1.1512) 
SEA 
 -0.5884* 
(-1.7834) 
 -0.6248* 
(-1.8932) 
NYM 
 -0.1924 
(-0.5420) 
 -0.2363 
(-0.6511) 
ATL 
 -0.1556 
(-0.4408) 
 -0.3566 
(-1.0022) 
MIA 
 -0.0239 
(-0.0583) 
 -0.0416 
(-0.0998) 
PHI 
 -0.4476 
(-1.2988) 
 -0.5637 
(-1.5805) 
WAS 
 -0.4995 
(-1.1312) 
 -0.4914 
(-1.0668) 
CIN 
 -0.3932 
(-0.9634) 
 -0.5106 
(-1.2764) 
STL 
 -0.0796 
(-0.1848) 
 -0.1548 
(-0.3492) 
CHC 
 -0.3717 
(-1.0941) 
 -0.4366 
(-1.2767) 
MIL 
 -0.3712 
(-0.8356) 
 -0.3423 
(-0.7468) 
PIT 
 -0.7877* 
(-1.7840) 
 -0.8367* 
(-1.8735) 
SF 
 -0.6699* 
(-1.7637) 
 -0.7369* 
(-1.8472) 
SD 
 -0.6623* 
(-1.8922) 
 -0.7109** 
(-2.0158) 
LAD 
 -0.9324*** 
(-2.7461) 
 -0.9281*** 
(-2.6500) 
ARI 
 -0.5017 
(-1.5211) 
 -0.4646 
(-1.3705) 
     
R2 0.6051 0.6008 0.6013 0.6177 
Adjusted R2 0.5933 0.5727 0.5762 0.5765 
All results in Table 5 reflect White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
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WAR, Age, Re-sign 
 WAR, measuring the on field performance of players, has a positive 
relationship with the duration of contracts that is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This is simply showing that better players earn longer contracts. On the 
other hand, age (expressed as a binomial age plus age squared) shows that the 
older a player gets, the shorter duration his contract will be, on average. This also 
is simple and logical; the older a player is, the less amount of time he will have 
playing productively, or playing at all, and therefore his contracts will be shorter 
term deals.  
 Surprisingly, a player re-signing with his previous team has a negative 
relationship with the duration of his contract of about 0.2 to 0.25 years, 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This suggests that when players re-sign, 
they take contracts for shorter terms. I expected that when they re-sign with their 
team, they would want to stay in that same city, and would be willing to sign a 
longer term contract. However, the opposite is shown.  This could be related to 
the results in Chapter 5, which showed higher salaries for players re-signing with 
their previous team. Perhaps players re-signing have a tendency to demand higher 
salaries in exchange for allowing the team to make the deal a shorter term contract. 
 
Years, Months 
 Unlike the present value per year results of a steady increase in salaries 
throughout the past decade, the duration of contracts has seemed to spike in three 
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particular offseasons: 2006-2007, 2007-2008, and 2011-2012. Each of these 
periods have seen the duration of contracts about 0.6 years longer than in 2002-
2003 (left out as a variable for comparison sake), with statistical significance at 
the 10% level for each of their coefficients. There seems to be a steady increase 
until 2007-2008, followed by a steady decline, followed by another increasing 
trend from 2010-2011 through 2011-2012. Through the 2007-2008 offseason, the 
trend seems to be giving out longer free agent contracts to established, yet older, 
players. We have seen long term free agent contracts fail time and time again, like 
the Barry Zito contract previously referenced. This could explain the decrease 
after 2007-2008 seeing less teams giving out long term contracts to free agents 
unless the player is truly elite. Furthermore, this decrease after 2007-2008 can be 
partially attributed to the great recession and economic downturn. This inhibited 
spending across industries around the world, and could be a significant factor 
leading to the decrease in long term contracts in Major League Baseball. 
The more recent increase can be attributed to the recent trend of teams 
locking up their young stars to long term contract extensions very early on in their 
careers. These deals give the team the ability to control costs and make sure they 
can keep their best young players, while providing these young players with long 
term financial security that they have never had before. These deals have become 
much more common within the past few years, and they tend to be very long term 
contracts. 
Looking at different times in the offseason during which contracts are 
signed, it is expected that January and February would have negative relationships 
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with contract durations. They each have negative relationships of approximately 
one, with each coefficient being statistically significant at the 5% level. Most free 
agent contracts are signed during the months of November, December, January, 
and February. As noted in Chapter 5, December is when many high-priced 
contracts are signed at the winter meetings. January and February tends to see 
lower quality players signing smaller contracts, who would logically have shorter 
term deals. However, this shows that if a player wants to have long term security, 
his agent should try seek to consummate a deal before January. 
The months seeing the longest term contracts in these results are 
September (omitted from results for comparison), March, and April, although 
these relationships are not statistically significant. Most of the contracts signed 
during these months are players re-signing with their previous teams who are not 
eligible for free agency. These players are usually young and logically will secure 
longer contracts because they have years remaining before they will be eligible to 
become free agents and are under the team’s control until then.  
 
Years to Free Agency 
Years remaining until free agency having a positive relationship with 
contract duration of between 0.3 and 0.4 once again makes perfect sense. These 
relationships are all statistically significant at the 1% level. The longer a player 
will have to wait before becoming a free agent, the longer term the contracts will 
tend to be.  
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For example, if a player has completed one season in the major leagues, he 
has five years remaining under team control before being eligible for free agency: 
two years during which the team can pay him anything at least the minimum 
salary required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and three years of 
arbitration eligibility. If he negotiated a four year contract extension, he would 
then have one more year of arbitration eligibility after the contract expires. 
Instead, the team and player would likely negotiate a contract of five years or 
even more so that the player wouldn’t have to go through arbitration and the team 
may be able to delay the player’s free agency by signing an extension of more 
than five years. 
 
No Trade Clause 
Similarly to the results in Chapter 5, a no trade clause has a large positive 
relationship with the duration of contracts that is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. It is only included as a variable when teams and agents are excluded due to 
the tendency of some teams and/or agents to often or never include no trade 
clauses in contracts. As discussed in Chapter 5, only the best players are able to 
get teams to include no trade clauses in their contracts. These are also the players 
who are able to secure long term contracts, leading to this positive relationship. 
Players who want no trade clauses also want to stay with the team that they are 
signing with, which leads them to also seek a long term contract to stay with the 
team longer. 
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Agents 
When evaluating agents, Bob Garber again seems to be doing a poor job 
of negotiating contracts for his clients. Not only does he negotiate below average 
salaries per year, but he also negotiates contracts lasting approximately 0.75 years 
less than average, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Similar to his 
results for salary per year, this coefficient is a larger negative when teams are not 
included as variables, possibly due to dealing with the Kansas City Royals often, 
which also has a negative coefficient.  
Randy and Alan Hendricks also have a negative relationship with contract 
duration, with a coefficient of approximately -0.6 that is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. They have signed a lot of older clients, like Yankees starting pitcher 
Andy Pettitte, who play into their late thirties and early forties (Agency Database, 
2013). These types of players typically sign a series of one year contracts at this 
late stage of their careers until they retire. 
Alan Nero also has a negative relationship with contract duration of about 
-0.65, statistically significant at the 10% level. Out of his 15 contracts negotiated 
in the sample, 11 of them were for starting pitchers Randy Johnson and Chien-
Ming Wang, and catcher Jose Molina (Euston, 2013). Randy Johnson was one of 
the best pitchers in baseball, but all of his contracts in the sample were towards 
the end of his career, including a three year deal, a two year deal, and a one year 
deal to close out his career (Euston, 2013). Chien-Ming Wang has been trying to 
recover from a serious shoulder surgery for several years. He was non-tendered 
by the Yankees after the surgery, and he signed a one year contract with the 
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Nationals, followed by two more one year deals with the Nationals. Until he can 
prove he is healthy and able to perform effectively, no team is willing to give him 
more than a one year deal. Jose Molina has been a backup catcher during his 
entire career. Backup players are relatively replaceable, so teams very rarely give 
them long term contracts. Molina has signed four different two year contracts 
negotiated by Nero. 
Interestingly, Wasserman Media Group and Arn Tellem each show 
coefficients of approximately -0.4, although only statistically significant for 
Wasserman Media Group. This is interesting because Arn Tellem is the most 
prominent agent for Wasserman Media Group (Wasserman Media Group). The 
Wasserman Media Group variable represents all other agents under the company. 
This shows that as a company strategy, Wasserman Media Group, led by Arn 
Tellem, values negotiating slightly shorter term deals. 
Paul Cohen exhibits a positive relationship with contract duration of about 
0.6 years. This relationship is only statistically significant when teams are not 
included as variables, and it is also higher in this case. His two longest contracts 
negotiated are both for Troy Tulowitzki, a star shortstop for the Colorado Rockies 
(Euston, 2013). He negotiated one seven year contract and one eleven year 
contract with the Rockies for Tulowitzki. When looking at the teams’ coefficients, 
the Rockies are omitted as a point of comparison for all other teams. However, 
every other team’s coefficient is negative, showing that the Rockies tend to give 
out the longest term contracts. This is picking up some of the positive relationship 
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from Paul Cohen’s coefficient when teams are included, because part of it is 
attributed to the Rockies. 
Dan Horwits has a positive relationship with contract duration of about 0.4 
that is statistically significant at the 10% level. When looking at the 16 contracts 
he has negotiated in the sample, only two of them are longer than three years, and 
only four of them are longer than two years. However, only two of them are for 
one year. Horwits has effectively negotiated many two year contracts for marginal, 
aging players, with situations that many agents would only be able to negotiate a 
one year contract. 
Dan Lozano’s relationship with contract duration is 0.55, and falls just 
short of statistical significance. However, Lozano has negotiated contracts for 
many of baseball’s stars, like perennial All-Stars Albert Pujols and Alex 
Rodriguez (Agency Database, 2013). Representing such highly skilled players 
who were signing contracts in the prime of their careers has hurt Lozano’s 
coefficient in this case. Basically, because Lozano’s clients are such superior 
players, he is “supposed” to secure them long term deals, attributing to factors 
like WAR and age. Therefore, it is still impressive that Lozano’s coefficient is 
even slightly positive, as he has still negotiated very long contracts for them.  
It is also worth noting that superior agents discussed in Chapter 5, like 
Scott Boras, Greg Genske, Gregg Clifton, and Greg Landry all have coefficients 
close to zero without statistical significance. This shows that these agents do not 
have a philosophical ideal contract duration that they usually tend to negotiate. 
Rather, they have the versatility to negotiate long term contracts for some players, 
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and shorter term agreements for others, depending on their clients’ needs and 
career stage. 
Overall, more agents show statistically significant relationships with 
contract duration than with salary per year. To have a statistically significant 
relationship with salary per year, the agent has to have significantly better (or 
worse) negotiating skills. However, a statistically significant relationship with 
contract duration can simply represent an agent’s philosophy, rather than superior 
or inferior skills. 
 
Teams 
Every team’s coefficients in Table 5 are negative, showing that the 
Colorado Rockies tend to give the longest term contracts, along with the Miami 
Marlins, St. Louis Cardinals, Los Angeles Angels, and Toronto Blue Jays, who 
have the highest coefficients, which are the coefficients closest to zero because 
they are all negative. The Rockies, as previously referenced, have given out two 
extremely long contracts to Troy Tolowitzki. They have also given Carlos 
Gonzalez, star outfielder, a seven year contract (Euston, 2013). The strategy in 
these moves was to build their team around these two stars. However, they have 
also given relatively long contracts to mediocre players, especially pitchers. Coors 
Field, Colorado’s home stadium is known to be a great venue for batters to hit 
home runs due to the thin air at Denver’s altitude. The Rockies have always 
struggled to sign pitchers, and they are showing an undisciplined approach of 
giving multiyear contracts to mediocre pitchers.  
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The case of the Marlins is very similar to the one discussed in Chapter 5. 
They are known to be very frugal. However, when they do spend money, they do 
so lavishly and often recklessly, both in terms of contract length and annual salary. 
They also try to sign their young players to long term contracts to get a discount. 
Although the Cardinals are not known as free spenders, they have shown a 
willingness to commit long term contracts for their own free agents. They tend to 
value keeping their best players, and are willing to sign long term contracts to do 
so, feeling that it is not quite as risky as signing another team’s free agent to a 
long term contract. We have seen this in eight year contracts they have given to 
Albert Pujols, outfielder Matt Holliday, and third baseman Scott Rolen, a seven 
year contract for catcher Yadier Molina, six year contracts for starting pitchers 
Chris Carpenter and Adam Wainwright, and four year contracts for Carpenter 
again and closer Jason Isringhausen (Euston, 2013). 
The Angels have also recently signed many players to long term contracts, 
although they have tended to sign other teams’ free agents as well as their own. 
They recently signed Albert Pujols for ten years and C.J. Wilson for five years in 
the 2011-2012 offseason (Euston, 2013). They have also extended infielder Erick 
Aybar and starting pitcher Ervin Santana for five years each (Euston, 2013). The 
Angels play in the large market of Los Angeles and this long term spending 
should continue. 
The Toronto Blue Jays, conversely, have shown a tendency to extend their 
young players to lucrative long term contracts prior to their free agency eligibility. 
They have extended All-Star outfielder Jose Bautista for six years, outfielder 
70 
 
Vernon Wells for five years and then eight years, starting pitcher Roy Halladay 
for five years, outfielder Alex Rios for eight years, second baseman Aaron Hill 
for seven years, and outfielder Adam Lind for seven years (Euston, 2013). Most 
of these extensions are for young, talented players who are still years away from 
free agency. The Blue Jays try to sign these players at discounts before they can 
command huge salaries on the free agent market. 
On the other hand, the Cleveland Indians tend to sign the shortest term 
contracts, with a coefficient of -1 that is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This is in addition to their tendency to pay low salaries seen in Chapter 5. As 
previously stated, 13 of their 19 contracts signed in the sample were re-signing 
their own players, with 11 of them being players with at least one year until free 
agency. The Indians do, however, give long term contracts to these young players 
prior to free agency. However, when taking these factors into account of how long 
these players have until free agency, and the players’ performance levels, the 
Indians manage to keep the terms of their contracts shorter than we may expect. 
The Dodgers also show a negative coefficient just short of reaching one 
full year per contract on average, with statistical significance at the 1% level. 
They have exhibited a very disciplined approach when it comes to terms of free 
agent contracts. Of their 41 contracts signed in the sample, they have only gone 
beyond four years twice. The first was signing outfielder Juan Pierre for five years 
(Euston, 2013). He was a free agent from the Marlins in high demand because of 
his speed, but this contract seems like a rare mistake for the Dodgers. The second 
contract of more than four years was signing superstar outfielder Matt Kemp for 
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eight years (Euston, 2013). At the time of the signing, Kemp was one year away 
from free agency and just 26 years old, coming off of a season of 8.8 WAR, 
which is incredible (FanGraphs, 2013). The Dodgers knew they would have to 
give him a long term contract to keep him. 
The San Francisco Giants and San Diego Padres each have a coefficient of 
approximately -0.7 with statistical significance at the 10% level. The Padres have 
shown a willingness to give out long term contract extensions. However, the 
players they sign to these extensions are almost always very young and years 
away from free agency. They extended players like starting pitcher Jake Peavy (5 
years, age 23 and 6 years, age 26), outfielder Cameron Maybin (6 years, age 24), 
and first baseman Adrian Gonzalez (5 years, age 24) (Euston, 2013). They seem 
to have a philosophy of locking up their young, productive players for five to six 
years when they are in their mid twenties and a few years away from free agency. 
The Giants, on the other hand, have shown a strong reluctance to give out 
any long term contracts. Of the 36 contracts they’ve signed in the sample, they 
have only gone more than three years six times. Two were extensions for their 
best pitcher, Matt Cain, who signed a five year deal at age 21 followed by a seven 
year deal at age 26 (Euston, 2013). Another contract was an eight year deal with 
Madison Bumgarner, another pitcher, at age 21 (Euston, 2013). Other than those 
three extensions, they signed Barry Zito to a seven year free agent contract that 
was discussed earlier, and re-signed two other of their own players, both pitchers. 
The Giants tend to shy away from long term commitments, but when they do sign 
players long term, they are usually extensions for their best young pitchers.  
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The Kansas City Royals and Seattle Mariners both have coefficients of 
approximately -0.65 with statistical significance at the 10% level. Both franchises 
tend to sign a lot of one year free agent contracts, while only signing multi-year 
deals for their own players. Most of these are young players developed by the 
teams’ minor league systems, like designated hitter Billy Butler of the Royals and 
All-Star starting pitcher Felix Hernandez of the Mariners, who each received five 
year contracts (Euston, 2013). 
 
Chapter 7 
Applying the Time Value of Money 
 
 Basic financial theory states that the value of money depends on the time 
it is received. A dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future. This is due 
to opportunity costs, which are the costs of foregoing another opportunity. For 
example, a dollar today could earn interest in the bank, be invested in stocks or 
bonds, or be used in a purchase. None of these activities can be done with a dollar 
received one year from now. 
 However, Major League Baseball teams and agents don’t seem to use or 
practice this theory when negotiating contracts. Contracts are often back-loaded 
(highest payments occur at the end of the contract) with little consideration to the 
effect of the present value of the contract being signed. It is in a player’s best 
interest to receive his salary payments as soon as possible. If he received a heavily 
front-loaded contract (highest payments occur at the beginning of the contract), 
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one would expect him to be willing to take a slight discount in exchange. This 
presents a great opportunity for teams with high payrolls that are close to the 
competitive balance tax threshold. As discussed in Chapter 2, calculations of team 
payrolls for the competitive balance tax are based on the average annual value of 
player contracts, rather than the actual payment received by the player in that 
season. 
 As an example, I will look at two of the largest recent contracts that the 
Yankees have signed, one for third baseman Alex Rodriguez and one for first 
baseman Mark Teixeira, to illustrate what the effects would have been if the 
contracts were heavily front-loaded. This is extremely pertinent to the Yankees 
because they have been over the tax threshold for many years, and will pay 50% 
of their overages this year. They are currently making every effort to get under the 
$189 million threshold for 2014. For this exercise, I will discount the cash flows 
in the contracts by 1% to be conservative. 
Alex Rodriguez current contract structure (in $millions): 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
$29 $33 $33 $32 $30 $29 $28 $21 $20 $20 
Total Nominal Value: $275  Average Annual Value: $27.5 
Present Value at Time of Signing (discounting at 1%): $261.61 
 
Proposed new structure (in $millions): 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
$255.66 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 
Total Nominal Value: $264.66 Average Annual Value: $26.47 
Present Value at Time of Signing (discounting at 1%): $261.61 
 
Mark Teixeira current contract structure (in $millions): 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
$25 $20 $22.5 $22.5 $22.5 $22.5 $22.5 $22.5 
Total Nominal Value: $180  Average Annual Value: $22.5 
Present Value at Time of Signing (discounting at 1%): $172.19 
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Proposed new structure (in $millions): 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
$167.18 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 
Total Nominal Value: $174.18 Average Annual Value: $21.77 
Present Value at Time of Signing (discounting at 1%): $172.19 
 Heavily front-loading these contracts in this proposed fashion would net 
the same present value of payments. The players could invest a large portion of 
their substantial up-front payments and have the opportunity to earn much more 
money on it, while the team could save some money on the competitive balance 
tax. If the Yankees had structured these contracts, in this way, the combined 
average annual value of these two contracts would decrease from $50 million to 
$48.24 million. This may sound insignificant, but it would save the Yankees 
$880,000 on its competitive balance tax payment for 2013 alone.  
The Yankees have been paying the competitive balance tax for the entire 
life of these contracts, although prior to 2013 it was only at a 40% rate. From 
2008-2013, my proposed contract structure would have saved the Yankees $4.1 
million in competitive balance tax payments, and this is from only these two 
contracts, ignoring the rest of the team. Furthermore, it would help them 
tremendously in their effort to get under the $189 million threshold for 2014. The 
contracts of Rodriguez and Teixeira would count as $48.24 million instead of $50 
million, a decrease in the Yankees payroll for competitive balance tax purposes of 
$1.76, which would make it much easier to get the payroll under $189 million, 
while again only looking at two contracts. 
This method of heavily front-loading contracts would require extreme 
capital reserves in order to pay the incredibly large first year salary. However, the 
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Yankees are currently paying out approximately $200 million in player salaries 
each year. If they committed to paying players by this front-loading philosophy, it 
would be much more manageable once fully implemented for the full roster. A 
wealthy franchise like the Yankees should also have the ability to borrow large 
sums of money in order to cover the costs of implementing the strategy, which 
has a significant cost saving potential if implemented well. 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions & Implications 
 
Summary of Conclusions 
 Overall, many factors affecting Major League Baseball player salaries are 
overlooked yet have profound relationships to how players are paid. The most 
important factor that goes into a player’s salary is his on-field ability. However, 
this is clearly not the only factor. Players may look to data like these in choosing 
their agent. Players who want to maximize their per year salary should seek 
representation by agents like Scott Boras, Gregg Clifton, Greg Genske, or Greg 
Landry, while players who value long term stability and security should hire 
agents like Paul Cohen, Dan Horwits, or Dan Lozano.  
Agents can also use this information to best position their players for the 
largest contracts. They can target specific teams which tend to overpay players, 
and narrow this search based on if the client is a hitter or pitcher. They can also 
use this information to better inform their clients of the implications of signing an 
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extension versus waiting until free agency; or by modeling how much a contract 
is due to pay them immediately in an extension, versus how much they may 
expect to earn on the free agent market a year later. This will enable player 
representatives to quantitatively inform their clients in order to better serve their 
best interests.  
Teams may also use these data to model their strategies after teams like 
the Indians, Mariners, or Padres. These teams don’t have very strong financial 
resources, yet find undervalued players that they can pay below market value 
salaries with their operating capital. Teams with larger budgets like the Yankees, 
Red Sox, Dodgers, and Phillies may want to evaluate their strategies and emulate 
them on a larger scale budget to become even more efficient. This doesn’t mean 
passing on the highest price free agents, but targeting them at a lower cost by 
maybe trying to beat the market to signing them in November, or waiting to enter 
into heavy negotiations until January, while trying to avoid the winter meetings.  
 
Future Research 
 This study is just a general overview of outside factors that may contribute 
to player salaries and terms of contracts. Much more detailed studies may follow 
by measuring the various negotiating strategies of different agents and teams in 
more detail. One may look to more quantitatively study which agents tend to 
negotiate the best contract extensions versus the best free agent contracts; or 
which teams tend to sign the most players at the winter meetings versus waiting 
until January, etc.  
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 Further research may also focus on present value of player contracts 
versus nominal values and average annual values to see which number is more 
focused on by both teams and agents. Financial studies like this may also seek to 
look into the effects of options on player salaries and how they are valued in 
contracts. These financial studies are of great interest to me and are areas which I 
plan to pursue more in the future.  
 
Implications of Major League Baseball’s New Collective Bargaining Agreement 
 On December 12, 2011, a new Collective Bargaining Agreement went into 
effect in Major League Baseball, effective through the 2016 season. Although the 
basic framework regarding player contracts has remained the same, there are a 
few changes in this CBA that have been changed from years past which may have 
implications for future player contracts. 
 First, the system described in Chapter 2 for draft pick compensation going 
to teams who fail to re-sign Type A and Type B free agents has been abolished. 
Instead, teams who fail to re-sign their free agents will only receive draft pick 
compensation if they offered a guaranteed contract of at least one year for a salary 
of at least the average of the top 125 player salaries from the previous season 
within five days of the end of the World Series (Major League Baseball, 2011). 
This will decrease the amount of instances in which a player designated as Type 
A is forced to take a decreased salary due to teams’ hesitation to forfeit a first 
round draft pick. Under this new system, it is unlikely that a player who would 
previously face those circumstances would be offered the qualifying offer. 
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 Additionally, Major League Baseball has instituted spending restraints on 
its amateur draft (Major League Baseball, 2011). In the past, teams were free to 
spend any amount of money they wanted in order to sign players they have 
drafted. However, now each draft slot is assigned an allotted amount of money to 
use as a signing bonus. If a team exceeds its allowance as a total for all of its 
picks in the first 10 rounds, there are severe consequences such as taxes on their 
overages and even the loss of future draft picks (Major League Baseball, 2011). A 
very similar system has been implemented for signing international players. In the 
past, foreign amateur players were treated as any other free agents were, without 
any restrictions on signing them. However, the new CBA has also imposed 
spending limits on foreign amateur players in which teams exceeding their 
allowance must pay taxes on overages and may be forbidden from signing 
international amateur players for more than a relatively insignificant sum of 
$250,000 in the subsequent year (Major League Baseball, 2011). 
These policies will vastly decrease the amount of money spent on drafted 
players and foreign amateur talent, which could result in savings that were 
previously spent on these two areas being shifted to use in free agency and 
contract extensions for major league players. This has the potential to 
significantly increase salaries of MLB players across the board on average. 
This only increases the importance of fully understanding the Major 
League Baseball labor market. MLB General Managers and agents must be able 
to see all factors affecting player salaries, including talent levels as well as 
external factors examined in this study, in order to accomplish their jobs 
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effectively in a market that has grown steadily over the past decade and figures to 
grow even more in the upcoming years. 
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Summary 
 
In 2003, Michael Lewis published Moneyball: The Art of Winning an 
Unfair Game, which forever changed the finances and economics of baseball. It 
began a movement towards using advanced statistical analysis to determine the 
value of baseball players, in order to build a roster that will win the most games at 
the lowest cost. The Moneyball movement has resulted in a multitude of new 
statistics to try to drill a player’s value down to one number that represents his 
marginal revenue product, or his individual contribution to the team’s success. 
 The biggest cost for Major League Baseball teams is typically paying their 
players. Players often get paid millions of dollars because there are so few people 
who have their athletic abilities and skill sets needed to succeed in baseball at the 
major league level. Major League Baseball does not have a salary cap; that is, 
teams can pay players whatever they want, and there is no limit as to how high a 
single player’s salary can go, nor how high a team’s player payroll can go. Teams 
are able to govern themselves when it comes to signing players to contracts. Some 
teams play in large markets, like the New York Yankees, and have the largest 
revenue streams, while others, like the Oakland Athletics, struggle to generate 
revenue and thus tend to spend less money on their players. Therefore, it is of the 
utmost importance for Major League Baseball teams to efficiently spend their 
money on players in order to win games at the lowest possible cost. 
 The biggest factor that determines how much a player will be paid is his 
production on the playing field. The better one plays, the more he will be paid. 
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However, there are many other factors that affect how much players are paid that 
are often overlooked.  
 This project looks at many other factors, aside from a player’s talent and 
production levels, that may affect how much he is paid. Some of these factors 
include: 
• The player’s age 
• The time of year of the contract’s signing 
• Whether the player is a Free Agent or not 
• The team signing the player 
• The player’s agent 
Almost all of these other external factors that relate to how much players 
are paid go back to Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement 
with the Players Association. This document sets out all of the rules for terms of 
employment for teams employing players.  
Players ultimately make the most money as baseball players when they are 
free agents. A player is a free agent when he doesn’t have a playing contract and 
is free to negotiate a new contract with any team. This is the largest market a 
player will ever have to sell his services to all of Major League Baseball’s 30 
teams. However, the Collective Bargaining Agreement prohibits players from 
becoming free agents until they have played for at least six years. This is just one 
example of the Collective Bargaining Agreement skewing player salaries so that 
the best players don’t always simply make the most money in any given year.  
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After looking at factors like time of year and a player’s free agency status, 
this project goes on to examine Major League Baseball teams and players’ agents 
as factors relating to player salaries. This aspect looks at which teams do the best 
job of paying their players the least amount of money holding the level of talent 
that they are signing as a constant, as well as which agents do the best job of 
signing their clients to the highest paying contracts, given their level of on-field 
talent.  
The significance of this project varies from the perspective of teams, 
agents, and Major League Baseball as a whole. This project can allow teams to 
more effectively pursue strategies to sign players to lower salaries of a given 
performance level, and model their strategies after the teams who are already 
doing this most successfully. Player agents can use the results of this project to 
counter these strategies and find effective ways to position their clients for the 
largest contracts. As a whole, Major League Baseball can take these results to 
signify the current state of its economics of player salaries. It can use the 
information presented to try to make this system more efficient in cooperation 
with the Players Association in future Collective Bargaining Agreements. 
This study uses linear regression analyses to isolate relationships between 
player salaries and a multitude of different factors which may have significant 
relationships to salaries. I have used online websites and databases to gather 
contract data and player performance data for a time period of one decade. The 
data includes a sample size of 761 player contracts signed between the 2002-2003 
offseason and the 2011-2012 offseason. The project includes breakdowns of 
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looking at statistical results for just hitters, just pitchers, and all players combined, 
in order to gain the best understanding of what is really impacting player contracts, 
and which kinds of contracts are being affected. 
 In the future, studies like this may be expanded to cover certain aspects in 
more detail. For example, studying which agents pursue which specific strategies 
may be of utmost interest to a future researcher. Furthermore, there are more 
possible applications of financial modeling tools that can be applied to Major 
League Baseball’s player contract structure. Options are a prominent feature in 
player contracts, and future researchers may wish to focus on options exclusively 
to try to apply financial option modeling techniques to Major League Baseball 
player contract options, which can be held by the team and/or the player. Future 
researchers also may wish to pursue studies like this within other professional 
sport leagues like the National Basketball Association or the National Football 
League. 
 Overall, this project represents a broad view of a very encompassing topic 
within professional sports, as I have tried to look at many different aspects 
relating to player contracts rather than focusing on one in particular. 
